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Abstract
In the past several decades, there has been a resurging interest in the study o f the 
interactions between economic growth, income inequality, and financial development. 
Since the introduction o f  Kuznets’s (1955) hypothesis, a great deal o f  literature has 
been devoted to the investigation o f  the causal relationship o f economic growth and 
income distribution. Another major strand o f thought, often associated with the work 
o f Goldsmith (1969), Mckinnon (1973), and Shaw (1973), stresses the connection 
between economic growth and financial development. However, the link between 
financial development and income inequality has rarely been explored by the 
scholastic world both theoretically and empirically. It is not only unusual but surprising 
to see that so little attention has been paid to the study o f  this area considering a large 
portion o f families in developed countries (DCs) and newly industrialized countries 
(NICs) engage in the activities o f  financial market on a daily basis.
The purpose o f this study is to outline a tentative theoretical model to study the 
relationship between financial development and income inequality in general and to 
present an empirical analysis o f  Taiwan’s case to examine what result can be derived 
from the available data. The choice o f  Taiwan for our study has several folds. The first
is that for the past 30 years, Taiwan, along with its counterparts o f Hong Kong, 
Singapore, and South Korea has been considered as the most successful economic 
story for the developing countries. Not only does Taiwan sustain high economic 
growth but also maintains a fairly low degree o f  income inequality. However, just like 
most o f  the developed countries, in the turn o f 1980s, Taiwan encountered the reverse 
trend o f income distribution: rising income inequality. The main difference between 
Taiwan’s experience and that o f  most developed countries is that Taiwan retained a 
high rate o f  economic growth while most o f  the developed countries endured reduced 
growth even though income equality was experienced by both during the 1980s. It is 
also the first time in Taiwan’s short economic development history-fifty years—that 
the improvement in income equality was no longer in tandem with the economic 
growth. The second reason is that during that period o f  time, Taiwan’s government 
initiated a series o f  financial reform and liberalization measures gradually throughout 
the decade in order to further facilitate the transactions and deal with the new 
challenges brought about by the integration o f  the international financial market. It is 
o f great interest to probe if these two phenomena are correlated as it is alluded 
indirectly in some economic theories.
XI
Chapter 1 
Introduction
Two strands o f research have been pervasive in the study o f  economic growth and 
development. The first theme largely revolves around the traditional Kuznets (1955) 
hypothesis: over the transition course from rural to industrial economy, the income 
inequality rises during the early stage o f the development, tapers off in the intermediate 
phase, and finally starts to decline by the stage o f  maturity. In contrast to the 
conventional approach, which focuses on the interaction o f level and distribution o f 
income, recent studies emphatically address the effect o f international trade, 
technological progress and organizational change on income inequality due to the 
cunbiguous and mixed results o f  empirical investigation derived from the Kuznets 
hypothesis.
The principal argument about the effect o f  international trade on the distribution 
o f  income primarily stems from the neoclassical Hechscher-Ohlin-Samuelson (HOS) 
theory. It states that countries will specialize in the production o f commodities that 
intensively use domestically abundant factors o f  production. Upon the opening to 
international trade, the price o f  the affluent factors will rise and that o f the scarce ones 
will fall. Consequently, the income gap between the abundant and scarce factor- will
be reduced and a  more equalitarian state o f  distribution will be realized. However, the 
emphasis and nature o f  this classical model are quite different from the latest studies. 
While the former stresses the effect o f trade on the dispersion o f income among land, 
capital, and labor, the latter focuses on the effect toward the distribution o f  income 
between individuals.
Another hypothesis in the literature o f income inequality speculates that 
technological progress is the single most dominant determinant o f  rising inequality in 
most o f  the OECD countries and certain newly industrialized countries (NICs) for the 
past two decades. It argues that, in essence, the progress o f  technology is skill-biased 
and in favor o f  the skilled labor; therefore, it magnifies the existing wage gap between 
workers o f  various skill levels. O f the recent advancement in technology, the 
advancement in computers and their application has been considered as the major 
culprit attributing to the worsening o f income inequality. A great number o f empirical 
analyses for the cases o f  the United States and some other OECD countries' show that 
both computers and other technical changes have a positive and significant impact on 
the increase o f income share o f  skilled workers.
Yet another school o f  economists believes that along with the other causes, the
‘ See Danziger and Gottschalk ( 1995). Aghion and Caroli ( 1999). and Haskel and Slaughter (2001 ) for 
details.
organizational change also plays a substantial role in the increase of inequality. It can 
be further divided into two types: between-industry and within-industry. According to 
the between-industry hypothesis, the shift o f employment out o f manufacturing and 
into the service sector, which is characterized by both lower wages and greater 
disparities in wages, would directly cause increases in inequality. While the 
between-industry theory stresses the changes across industries, the within-industry 
model examines the changes within the industry. The recent tide in the study o f the 
effect o f  organizational change on income inequality has turned in favor o f the latter 
after the emerging evidence documented in the work o f  Murphy and Welch (1993), 
Sheldon Danziger and Peter Gottschalk (1995), etc., shows that the impact of 
within-industry change is much more significant than that o f between-industry change.
The second major strand o f  thought prevalent in the development and growth 
literature, often associated with the work o f Goldsmith (1969), McKinnon (1973), and 
Shaw (1973), stresses the correlation between economic growth and financial 
development. Their theoretical framework is further extended by the studies o f 
Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990), Bencivenga and Smith (1992), and King and 
Levine (1993). However, in contrast to their forerunners’ work that focuses on the 
mechanisms channeling savings to investments in probing the possible connection 
between financial policy and economic growth, the more recent studies focus on the
importance o f  an alternative role o f  financial intermediation and endogenous growth 
process.
Even though the links between economic growth and income inequality and 
between financial development and economic growth have been extensively examined 
by the scholastic world, it is puzzling to see that very little attention has been paid to 
the nexus between financial development and income inequality both theoretically and 
empirically, considering the fact that a large portion o f  the population in the OECD 
countries and NICs is involved either directly or indirectly in the activities o f  the 
financial sector. Furthermore, this affiliation is only either indirectly or vaguely 
implied in the limited amount o f  studies on this subject. So far, there have been two 
main types o f  research on the link between financial development and income 
distribution. The first emphasizes the effect o f  credit rationing on the attainment o f 
education and training, which in turn will affect the distribution o f income. The other 
stresses the indirect influence o f  financial liberalization on the equality o f  earnings. 
Since the earnings from various financial investments; such as securities, bonds, 
mutual funds, etc., have become important sources o f income for more than half o f the 
families in most o f the OECD countries and NICs, it is necessary to identify the direct 
interaction between them in order to better and more comprehensively understand the 
vicissitudes o f  income inequality in the past several decades.
The purpose o f  this study is to investigate the effect o f financial development on 
income inequality in Taiwan. The choice o f  Taiwan for our study has three folds. First, 
even less attention has been called upon the studies o f  less developed countries (LDCs) 
and NICs in the literature. Secondly, the high participation rates—100% for households 
and 43.6% for the population over 18 years old"—in securities market present the best 
setting for the study o f  the correlation between financial development and income 
inequality. Thirdly, since Taiwan has been considered as one o f the most successful 
stories o f  economic development for developing countries (DCs) in modem history, a 
deeper and more complete understanding o f Taiwan’s situation will shed light not only 
on the issues o f how to balance economic growth and income distribution in Taiwan 
but also on the policy implication for those DCs closely following the developmental 
footsteps o f  the so-called four Asian dragons.
The remainder o f this discussion will be organized as follows. In chapter 2, a 
series o f essential and related theoretical and empirical studies in the links between 
economic growth and income distribution and between economic growth and financial 
development are reviewed to pave the way for our investigation o f the correlation o f 
income inequality and financial development. In chapter 3, a brief overview o f the 
vicissitudes o f  income distribution and the development o f a  financial system in
Source: Taiwan Stock Exchange.
Taiwan will be presented with the stress on the periods before and after the reform and 
liberalization o f capital market. Both the quantitative and qualitative evidence that 
suggests the causal relationship between them will also be discussed. In chapter 4, a 
theoretical model based on endogenous growth frameworks will be developed to 
analyze the link between financial development and income inequality. A distinctive 
concept toward the invention and innovation in the financial system will be introduced 
and incorporated into the model to reflect the reality that those advancements in the 
financial world are just as complicated as those in the engineering field. Accordingly, 
these advancements require an equal amount o f ability and knowledge to utilize them. 
In chapter 5, several tests on the hypotheses suggested in the previous chapter will be 
provided. Conclusions will be offered in chapter 6.
Chapter 2 
Survey of Literature
2.1. Introduction
This chapter will present a b rief review o f the literature in the two most pervasive 
strands o f  economic research—the links between economic growth and income 
inequality and between financial development and economic growth, and the relatively 
neglected link between financial development and income inequality.
2.2. Economic Growth and Income Inequality
Since the presentation o f  Kuznets hypothesis in 1955, the studies on the 
relationship between economic growth and income inequality have been expanded 
enormously. The early literature on income distribution and economic development, 
however, is dominated by Kuznets hypothesis. Based on his studies and analyses on 
the development o f  three developed countries—United States, United Kingdom, and 
Germany—for the period from 1880 to 1950, Kuznets proposed an inverted-U shaped 
curve to delineate the relation between income inequality and economic growth in his 
theoretical model. He found that the income inequality rises during the early stage o f 
development, then tapers off during the intermediate stage, and eventually declines by
the stage o f  maturity. While this hypothesis is far from being incontrovertible, other 
researchers have found evidence in support o f it. For example, Adelman and Morris 
(1973) confirm the increase in income inequality at the early stages o f development for 
44 developing countries as postulated in Kuznets inverted-U curve. Paukert (1973) 
found evidence that intracountry income inequality rises and falls with economic 
development by using cross-country data. Similarly, Danziger and Gottschalk (1995) 
verify the argument in their study o f the equity in U.S. for 1950 through 1980. 
However, this downward trend in inequality experienced by most OECD countries 
before 1980 has reversed sharply since 1980.' In light o f the recent evidence, new 
theories are needed to understand the impact o f  growth upon inequality. So far, three 
major types o f  studies have emerged on the scene in an effort to solve the mystical 
causes o f  the increasing income inequality across countries: international trade, 
technological progress, and organizational change.
2.2.1. International Trade
Recent studies in the effect o f  international trade on the distribution o f  income are 
mostly derived from and based on the HOS hypothesis propounded by Heckscher 
(1919) and Ohiin ( 1924). The correlation o f  international trade and income distribution
‘ See Deininger and Squire ( 1996). and Aghion ( 1998) for the details.
8
was first established by Heckscher in his revolutionary article ‘T he Effect o f Foreign 
Trade on the Distribution o f Income”. He attributed disparities in comparative costs, 
and hence in the pattern o f  trade, to dissimilarities in factor endowments rather than to 
differences in productivity as in the classical theory. OhIin fiirther expanded and 
elaborated Heckscher’s framework by incorporating Walrasian equilibrium, 
neoclassical theory, and monetary factors into the model to form the well-known HOS 
theorem. According to the theory, a country will export goods that are intensive in 
production in its abundant factors, and it will import goods intensive in its scarce 
factors. Hence, a trade boom will drive up the demand for its abundant factors and 
drive down the demand for the scarce ones, and lead to the narrowing o f the income 
gap between abundant and scarce factors. Even though recent studies in the correlation 
o f  international trade and income distribution still closely follow the principles o f  the 
HOS model, the focus o f  the distribution has been shifted from among land, capital and 
labor to between individuals.
Krugman ( 1981 ) examined the effect o f international trade on income inequality 
from the aspects o f  distribution effect and market size effect in a general equilibrium 
framework. Since both o f  the components are positively correlated with the income o f 
abundant factors, he suggests that the opening to trade will be in favor o f  them. As for 
the income o f scarce factors, the result is indecisive inasmuch as the sign o f  the
difference between the negative effect o f distribution and the positive effect o f market 
size is uncertain. By and large, his argument is in concert with the HOS theorem, i.e., 
the opening to trade will reduce the income inequality.
By adding two distinguishing features—overlapping generations and 
heterogeneous agents—to the HOS hypothesis, Fischer (1992) developed a dynamic 
two-sector trade model to investigate the effect o f trade on the intra- and 
inter-generational distribution o f income. He asserts that if the consumption good is 
labor-intensive, trade liberalization reduces personal income inequality in 
labor-abundant countries. This reduction in inequality continues over time until a new 
steady state is reached. Conversely, inequality increases in the long and short run in 
capital-abundant countries. If the consumption good is capital-intensive, the short run 
effect o f  trade liberalization is the same as in the previous case, but the long run effect 
is ambiguous.
Fischer and Serra ( 1996) further divided the types o f  bilateral trades into three 
categories: trade between developed countries, trade between developed and 
middle-income countries, and trade between developed and poor counties. They 
investigated how each type o f  trades will affect the distribution o f  income in the 
developed countries. In their general equilibrium model, they conclude that due to the
10
substitution effect o f intermediate goods imported, the trade between developed 
countries and middle-income countries will worsen the income equality o f  the former. 
Notwithstanding, the trade between developed countries and between developed and 
developing countries will at least impose no negative impact on the equality.
An ever-growing literature examines empirically the impact o f  international trade 
on the increasing income inequality and draws mixed results. Fieleke (1994) states that 
there is no convincing evidence to support the hypothesis that increased globalization 
has contributed substantially to greater inequality in income. Richardson (1995), and 
Feenstra and Hanson (1996) procured similar outcomes from their studies o f the 
United States. They found that trade only accounts for a very small share o f the 
increasing income inequality and its influence has slightly declined in the past decade. 
On the other hand, Savvides (1998), and Harrison and Hanson (1999) demonstrate that 
among less developed countries, especially Latin America countries, more open 
economies experienced greater increase in income inequality. However, Chakrabarti 
(2000) suggests in a cross-country study that greater participation in trade significantly 
reduces income inequality. His view is echoed in part by the literature o f  Das (2001) 
that shows that free trade decreases income inequality in less developed countries.
2.2,2. Technological Progress
I I
A growing amount o f literature argues that the demand shift in the relative labor 
has been caused by technological changes. These studies suggest that technological 
progress in nature is skill-biased in the sense that it enhances the differences in abilities 
across workers, and it leads inevitably to the increase o f  income inequality. Betts (1994) 
developed a human capital model to analyze the interaction between different levels o f 
technical changes and heterogeneous workers. According to his theory, there are three 
types of technological changes, namely, skill-using, skill-neutral, and skill-saving, 
given a non-degenerate, continuous uniform distribution o f abilities. Skill-using 
inventions, reflecting the fact o f recent technological progress, lead to increased 
training requirements. Skill-neutral inventions increase productivity without changing 
human capital needs, and skill-saving ones reduce the training needs. The time needed 
to learn a new invention is a decreasing function o f  abilities. A worker will decide 
whether to adopt a new invention based on the net effect o f  loss o f income caused by 
reduced working time and gain o f  income derived from the new technology on his 
production function. In a two-sector framework o f a technologically dynamic sector 
and a backward static one, skill-using inventions will only be adopted by those 
workers whose abilities are above a certain threshold; hence, they will increase the 
inequality o f income and induce shifts o f  labor out o f  the technologically dynamic 
sector. In contrast, skill-saving inventions are adopted only by lower-range workers;
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therefore, they reduce the inequality in income, causing shifts o f labor toward the 
innovation sector. Skill-neutral inventions cause no change in equality nor in the 
sectoral allocation o f labor.
Galor and Tsiddon (1997) contrived a theoretical model to examine the
relationships between technological progress, wage inequality, intergenerational
mobility, and economic growth. Their analysis is based on a model o f  a small, open,
overlapping generations economy that operates in a perfectly competitive world in
which economic activity extends over an infinite discrete time. In every period, the
economy produces a single homogeneous good, using physical capital and efficient
units o f  labor in the production process. The good is produced in several sectors, which
differ in production technologies, and can be used for consumption or saving.
Furthermore, they assume that individuals are identical in their preferences and in their
production technology o f human capital but different in ability and in parental type o f
human capital. The analysis demonstrates that the interplay between technological
progress and two components that determine an individual’s earnings: parental specific
human capital and the individual’s ability, governs the evolution o f income inequality,
intergenerational earnings mobility, the pace o f  technological progress, and economic
growth. In periods o f  major technological inventions, the ability effect is the
dominating factor, and mobility as well as inequality rises. In periods o f  technological
13
innovations, when existing technologies become more accessible, the parental human 
capital effect dominates, mobility diminishes and inequality decreases.
Galor and Moav (2000) developed a growth model featured with ability-biased 
technological transition that is responsible for the evolution o f  technology, education, 
and wage inequality in the United States and other advanced countries over the past 
several decades. Their study argues that an increase in the rate o f technological 
progress raises the return to ability and simultaneously generates a rise in the wage 
inequality between and within groups o f  skilled and unskilled workers, an increase in 
the average wage o f skilled workers, and a temporary decline in the average wage o f 
unskilled workers. Their paper also sheds light on the international technological 
spillovers o f  wage inequality. It suggests that in the presence o f  imperfect 
technological diffusion, wage inequality among technological leaders is likely to be 
greater than that among followers. In addition, institutional changes in a technological 
leader, which curtail the wage gap between skilled and unskilled labor and raise the 
rate o f  technological progress in the leader, would have an increasing impact on wage 
inequality among follower countries.
2.2 3 . Organizational Change
In recent years, a great deal o f  literature has emphasized the impact o f
14
organizational change on rising wage inequality. The general conception is that 
organizational change is in large part an offshoot brought about by technical progress 
but has its own unique influence on the distribution o f income. The effect of 
organizational change on income inequality is generally divided into between- and 
within-industry two types. Inasmuch as recent evidence demonstrates that the 
significance o f  the within-industry change far outweighs that o f the between-industry 
change, the former has become the emphasis o f  recent literature.'
Murphy and Welch (1993) documented that the labor force with a college degree 
has grown by 13.9 percent between 1970 and 1984, and the within-industry growth 
alone accounts for 11.9 percent o f  the increase. After analyzing manufacturing 
industries in detail, Berman, Bound, and Griliches (1994) conclude that most o f the 15 
percent drop in manufacturing employment came from shifts away from production 
workers toward other types o f workers within the industries. Bresnahan, Brynjolfsson 
and Hitt (1998) show that the decentralization within firms has a positive impact on 
firms’ investments in human capital, and as a result, induces the increasing inequality. 
Similarly, Caroli and Van Reenen (1999) demonstrate that both technological and 
organizational changes reduce the income share o f  unskilled labor within British and 
French enterprises.
Also see Danzigerand Gottschalk(1995), and Aghion (1998).
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2.3. Economie Growth and Financial Development
Based on two assumptions: (1 ) members o f an economy are different in ability to 
combine factors o f production and to utilize assets, and (2) economies o f  scale and 
indivisibility o f investments exist, Goldsmith (1969) hypothesizes that a financial 
superstructure accelerates economic growth and improves economic performance 
through channels o f  the function o f intermediation between savings and investments, 
which is made possible by the introduction o f financial instruments, as well as the 
enlargement o f the range o f financial assets, which follows from the creation o f 
financial institutions. As he notes, though, it is difficult to establish with confidence the 
direction o f the causal mechanism between them, i.e., whether financial development 
leads economic growth or financial development reflects economic growth.
Acknowledging the connection between financial development and economic 
growth and the deleterious effect o f financial repression on economic growth, Shaw 
(1973) and McKinnon (1973) developed a debt intermediation hypothesis concerning 
the effect o f financial repression. The debt intermediation states that a perfect and 
competitive financial market operates according to Walrasian equilibrium. Under this 
assumption, the supply o f  credit is positively related to interest rates while the demand 
for credit is negatively related to them. Equilibrium is characterized by market
16
clearance as flexible interest rates equalize the supply o f  and demand for credit. 
Financial repression reduces not only the real size o f the financial sector relative to 
non-financial ones but also the real rate o f growth.
Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990) developed a formal theoretical model to 
investigate the role o f financial development in economic growth in the framework of 
an endogenous growth model. Both the extent o f financial intermediaries and the rate 
o f economic growth are endogenously determined. Their study focuses on the role o f 
financial intermediation in providing investment information and in channeling 
savings to investments. According to their hypothesis, financial intermediation 
promotes growth because it allocates the fund supplied to the investments with the best 
possible returns through profit and risk analysis.
Bencivenga and Smith (1992) emphasize the role o f  financial intermediaries in 
providing liquidity to alter the composition o f savings. By means o f risk diversification, 
financial agents are conducive to savers, who face random future liquidity needs and 
retain unproductive assets when allocating their resources to investments more 
efficiently.
2.4. Financial Development and Income Inequality
17
The links between economic growth and income inequality and between Financial 
development and economic growth are well-defined and have been examined in detail. 
On the other hand, the relationship between financial development and income 
inequality has received little attention from income inequality theory in general, and 
from empirical tests in particular. The existing literature tends to analyze the role o f 
financial development in income through the effect o f credit rationing on the 
attainment o f education and on the accumulation o f capital. Again, Greenwood and 
Jovanovic mentioned in their article that it is costly to join the trade syndicate, so only 
individuals with the required amount o f  initial capital are able to enjoy the higher 
returns for their investment. They correspond these findings to the initial stage of 
development in Kuznets hypothesis. However, the relationship between them in the 
later stages o f  development is not clear. The theory presented by Piketty (1997) 
emphasizes the effect o f  interest rates on overall economic performance and the 
mobility o f wealth in a modified Solow model. With higher interest rates, it results in a 
lower rate o f  capital accumulation, slower economic growth and less mobility o f 
wealth. On the contrary, a lower interest rate is instrumental to the formation o f  capital 
and leads to high economic growth and better wealth mobility. Gregorio and Kim 
(2000) presented an endogenous growth model in which credit markets affect time 
allocation o f  individuals with different educational abilities. They hypothesize that the
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introduction o f a perfect credit market can allow individuals to optimize their utility by 
choosing between specializing in education for the more able and specializing in 
working for the less able. As a result, it promotes economic growth. With the 
assumption o f  heterogeneity o f agents, they further infer that the opening o f a perfect 
credit market results in a more disperse income distribution.
2.5. Conclusion
Compared with the two dominant strands o f research, relatively little attention has 
been paid to the link between financial development and income inequality. Even if 
there is any literature at all, most o f it is aimed at the conditions o f developed and 
OECD countries in an implicit fashion. Since countries in different development stages 
vary a great deal in terms o f  economic superstructure, investment tendency, education 
system and etc., it is very difficult, without adjustment, to apply the experience o f 
developed and OECD countries to newly industrialized countries.
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Chapter 3 
Financial Development and Income Inequality in Taiwan
3.1. Introduction
For the past several decades, Taiwan has experienced rapid economic growth with 
stable price and full employment, and it has emerged as one o f  the most successful 
newly industrialized economies in the world. Its real per capita income has grown at an 
average annual rate o f 8.6% from 1952 to 1996 and exceeded US 511,662 in 1996 as 
compared to US $200 in 1952. Even more impressive is that it posts a positive real 
growth rate in every single year except 1974, the year immediately after the first oil 
crisis in 1973. For the period o f 1970-1979, it boasts the highest average annual 
growth rate at 10.2% among all LDCs and NICs o f that time. With 8.1% growth rate 
for the interval o f  1980 to 1989, it is only second to China’s 9.3%. Recently, because o f 
political instability and the stock market crash during the early 1990s, Taiwan’s growth 
rate has dropped down to 6.3% and is only better than that o f Hong Kong among all 
Asian Pacific countries.
This rapid economic growth in Taiwan is accompanied by yet another two 
remarkable macroeconomic performances: low inflation and unemployment rates. For
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Table 3.1 Principal Economie Indicators
G row th R ate  o f Per Capital Intlation U nem ploym ent Interest
Year G N P (% ) GN P (USS) R ate ( % ) Rate(% ) Rate*
1961 6.83 142 4.12 14.40
1962 7.89 151 2.90 12.96
1963 9.36 166 0 3 6 11.52
1964 1 230 189 0.61 11.52
1965 11.00 203 0.65 11.52
1966 8.98 221 1.61 1132
1967 10.60 249 4.45 11.52
1968 9.12 283 6.08 10.80
1969 9.05 320 5.69 10.80
1970 11.32 360 3.76 10.80
1971 13.00 410 2.73 9.25
1972 13.40 482 2.62 8.50
1973 12.80 642 24.02 10.75
1974 1.20 853 33.99 12.00
1975 4 .40 890 0.23 10.75
1976 13.70 1041 3.62 9.50
1977 10.30 1193 8.46 8.25
1978 14.00 1443 7.65 1.67 8.25
1979 8.50 1758 12.50 1.27 11.00
1980 7.10 2155 22.21 1.23 11.00
■981 5.80 2443 9.07 1.36 11.75
1982 4.10 2419 2.45 2.14 7.75
1983 8.70 2573 -1.22 2.71 7.25
1984 11.60 2890 1.66 2.45 6.75
1985 5.60 2992 -1.32 2.91 5.25
1986 12.60 3646 2.64 2.66 4.50
1987 12.60 4839 1.93 1.97 4.50
1988 8.30 5829 1.11 1.69 4.50
1989 8.00 6977 3.14 1.57 7.75
1990 5 3 0 7413 4 3 6 1.67 7.75
1991 7.60 8189 3.88 131 6.25
1992 6.20 9536 3.42 1.51 5.63
1993 6.00 9872 4.62 1.45 5 3 0
1994 6.10 10566 2.64 1.56 5.50
1995 5.90 10934 4.58 1.79 5.50
1996 5.93 11662 2 3 3 2.60 5.00
1997 6.32 12457 0.26 2.72 5.25
1998 4.28 11333 2.12 Z 69 4.75
1999 5.87 12100 0.14 2.92 4.50
2000 5 .36 12916 1.66 2.99 4.63
• bank  d iscoun t rate
•* sources: D irectorate-G eneral o f  Budget. Accounting and Statistics ( DGB A S). Central Bank o f C hina (CBC). R .O .C.
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over 35 years, Taiwan has not only posted an average annual inflation rate at 5.3%, but 
it has also consistently managed to confine its inflation to a single-digit rate. The only 
periods during which Taiwan experienced double-digit inflation rates were those years 
during and immediately after oil crises. Another characteristic o f  Taiwan’s economic 
experience is its low unemployment rate. Except for the post World War H years, the 
unemployment rate never rose above 3% even in the years around the oil crises.
Even though the economy in Taiwan as a whole has been thriving under the 
regime o f free market, the formal financial sector has been heavily regulated and 
repressed. As a result, the informal sector or the curb market has become an important 
source o f financial loans for a great deal o f private investment projects. Facing 
mounting pressure from US multinational financial institutions and increasing 
international competition, Taiwan’s government initiated a series o f financial reform 
and liberalization measures beginning in the late 1970s in order to both sustain its 
economic growth and cope with the US pressures.
Another issue that has concerned and disturbed Taiwan’s economic development 
the most in the past two decades is the increasing income inequality. Since the late 
1970s, Taiwan has first seen its decreasing trend in income inequality come to an end 
and then gradually reverse. Since the ratios were first officially reported in 1964, the
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ratio o f  the income share of the top quintile to that o f the bottom quintile reached a 
record high o f  5.5! in Taiwan in 1998. As a result, the equality o f income distribution 
as well as the progress o f financial reform has become the foremost priority and 
challenge for the future development o f Taiwan’s economy.
The remainder o f  the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly examines 
the background, progress and effect o f the financial development and reform. Section 3 
provides a succinct review o f the vicissitude o f  the income inequality in Taiwan for the 
past forty years.
3.2. Financial Development
Like most LDCs, Taiwan’s financial system consists o f a repressed formal sector 
and a free informal sector. The formal financial sector was tightly regulated by the 
government by means o f interest rate control, select credit, entry barrier, and operation 
restrictions. Before 1960, there were only 6 nationwide banks, 8 regional small- and 
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) banks, and a number o f  credit cooperative 
associations to provide banking services to millions o f  households and businesses. The 
security market was not even established until 1962. All o f  the 6 nationwide banks 
were solely o r jointly owned by the state and accounted for 80.2%
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Table 3.2 Development of Financial Institutions
Year I960 1970 1980 1990 2000
Central Bank of China 
Depository Financial Intermediaries 
Domestic Banks
1 I I 1 1
Nationwide 6 II 16 24 53
Regional 8 8 8 8 8
Foreign Banks I 6 8 35 39
Credit Cooperative Associations 
Credit Department of Farmers’
36 39 39 74 48
Associations 
Credit Department of Fishermen’s
244 251 260 285 287
.Associations 4 4 4 24 27
Postal Savings System 1 1 I 1 I
Investment and Trust Companies 
Non-depository Financial Intermediaries
0 1 3 8 3
Life Insurances 2 8 8 13 32
Property and Casualty Insurances 
Financial Non-intermediaries
4 14 14 19 26
Bill Finance Companies 0 0 0 3 16
Security Finance Companies 0 0 0 1 4
Brokers - - 28 371 158
Dealers - - 10 37 105
Underwriters - - 22 60 75
Foreign Securities Firms 0 0 0 2 13
* sources: CBC. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
o f the total financial assets o f  the formal sector in I960. However, the primary function 
o f these formal financial institutions was to serve the financial needs o f public 
enterprises and selected large private firms. The responsibilities o f  serving the 
financial needs o f  consumers as well as small and medium firms are shared by regional
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private financial institutions and the informal sector. According to a survey conducted 
by the Bank o f Taiwan, the informal sector alone provided more than 40%  o f  the 
borrowings by private enterprises in the 1950s. This phenomenon indicated the 
inefficiency o f the formal financial sector in tapping the large pool o f savings and 
channeling them into the private enterprises. The risk of the informal market is high, 
and as a result, the interest rates are also higher than the official interest rates. However, 
the curb market lenders adopted more flexible standards to provide short-term loans to 
small and medium businesses on an unsecured basis as well as the use o f postdated 
checks as collateral. It was this combination and complementarity o f the repressed 
formal sector and the active informal sector that resolved the allocation dilemma 
between supply o f  and demand for capital and induced the rapid economic 
development through the 1970s.
3.2.1. Reform of the Banking System
The changes in the formal financial system were slow and reserved before the 
1970s. During that time, the most predominant progress was for the government to 
ease the entry barriers for farmers and fishermen’s associations to form credit unions 
and branches in rural areas for political reasons. Facing mounting external and internal 
pressure to open the market and recognizing the necessity to sustain the growth, the
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government o f Taiwan has initiated a series o f  measures to reform its banking system 
since the late 1970s. The major addresses o f  the reform included the interest rate 
decontrol, market entry deregulation, and privatization o f  major banks.
The Central Bank of China (CBC), the authority o f  the banking system, adopted a 
more flexible and practical policy and allowed interest rates to adjust to market 
equilibrium rates in the 1970s. Nonetheless, the CBC was still the ultimate setter o f 
interest rates. In 1981, the CBC started to relegate the control o f interest rates to the 
Bank Association, an organization designed to coordinate the business o f the banks, 
under the Law o f the Essential Points o f the Interest Rate Adjustment for Banks. Even 
though the range o f the interest rates was subject to the approval o f  the CBC, the CBC 
continued to support the interest rates that were proposed by the Bank Association.
The pace o f  the reform intensified in the late 1980s. In 1989, the Banking Law o f 
Adjustment (BLA), which affects one-quarter o f  the provisions in Banking Law, was 
enacted and promulgated to pursue further and broader overhauls o f the banking 
system with the policy thrusts in competitive and prudential deregulation. Under the 
competitive deregulation, the BLA enhances the competition in three major areas. First, 
the intervention o f the CBC over the interest rates was totally eliminated. Second, the 
entry barrier was removed and some o f  the state-owned banks were privatized to
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strengthen the efficiency o f  the banking system. Third, foreign banks have been given 
greater entry and business opportunities to enable them to be more competitive in the 
domestic market.
Under prudential deregulation, the BLA seeks to enhance the safety and stability 
o f  the banking industry with a number o f measures. First, in order to overcome the 
problems o f lack o f  authority and means to regulate the informal financial sector, the 
BLA attempts to restrict the underground financial industry with a better definition o f 
deposit taking so that the financial regulatory authorities would have a more adequate 
legal basis to prosecute the underground financial industry. Secondly, the BLA has 
introduced provisions on ownership concentration to ensure that the new commercial 
banks will be widely held. Thirdly, the BLA has mostly adopted the risk-based capital 
framework o f the Balse Committee on Banking Regulations and Supervisory practices, 
requiring that a bank have a ratio o f its capital to its risk-weighted assets o f not less 
than 8 percent unless otherwise approved by the Ministry o f  Finance (MoF).
In 1992 the BLA was further revised with the addition o f  five new articles and the 
amendment o f twelve existing ones. The stress of those articles is to regulate both 
secured and unsecured credit extensions to companies in which the directors, officers, 
employees, and major shareholders o f  a bank own a part o f  interest.
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3.2.2. Effects of the Reform on the Banking System
By 1960, there were only six state-owned nationwide banks, 8 SMEs and a 
number of credit cooperative associations to serve the banking needs o f households 
and businesses in Taiwan. From I960 to 1988, ten new state-owned or state-controlled 
banks were chartered to facilitate the implementation o f government economic policies 
as well as to serve the needs of specific and selected industries and objectives. After 
the lift o f the entry ban by the BLA in 1989, fifteen new privately owned commercial 
banks were licensed between 1991 and 1992. Since 1992, the number o f banks in 
Taiwan has grown steadily throughout the rest o f  the 1990s, and it reached 53 by the 
end o f 2000. While the number o f foreign banks that operate in Taiwan has grown at a 
much slower pace than domestic ones—increasing from 32 to 39—the figures o f their 
branches have more than doubled, rising from 33 to 70 for the same period. However, 
the number o f  locally operated credit cooperative associations declined after the 
promulgation o f the BLA, from its peak at 74 during 1987-1995, to 48 in 2000, due to 
the tighter supervision by the government after the 1985 scandal* as well as the 
mergers and conversions o f  several o f the credit cooperative associations.
In terms o f  the shares o f assets, deposits, and loans, the state-owned banks still
' It involved a grand scale o f  illegal lending, mismanagement of funds, and embezzlement.
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dominated the Industry in the years immediately following 1989. Nevertheless, their 
shares continued to fall to 53.5%, 46.3%, and 62.6% in 1990 from 70.5%, 77.3%, and 
76.8% in 1970, respectively. After the privatization o f several major state-owned 
commercial banks from 1993 on, these ratios further fell to 43.1%, 35.6%, and 25.3% 
in 2000. The total deposits and loans grew from NTS4881 billion and NTS3395 billion 
in 1988 to NTS 19309 billion and NTS 16311 billion in 2000, correspondingly. Despite 
the shares o f assets, deposits, and loans o f foreign banks that were maintained at about 
the same level before and after the BLA, their absolute values multiplied by more than 
four times. It is noteworthy that the role o f  the informal sector in the loan market has 
dropped to less than 25% in the 1990s from more than 40% before the 1970s. Another 
conspicuous progress is the ratio o f  loan to deposit, rising from 69.6% in 1988 to 
84.5% in 2000. Both o f these statistics indicate the significant improvement on the 
efficiency o f the formal banking system after a series o f  banking reform measures.
3.23. Reform of the Security Market
Taiwan’s security market was officially commenced in 1961 and was governed by 
a number o f regulations enacted through the 1950s. The Security Exchange Law (SEL), 
a comprehensive regulatory framework to replace much o f the fragmented regulations, 
was promulgated in 1968. There was no new addition or revision to the law until 1982
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when the security market o f Taiwan saw its capitalization fall for three consecutive 
years. In order to bolster the market, a number o f short-term measures were taken, 
which included increasing the rates on margin financing, opening the over the counter 
(OTC) market, and tightening the screening o f the listed companies.
In 1983, the government undertook the first stage o f a three-stage plan to allow
the entry o f foreign capital into the security market by permitting securities investment
trust enterprises (SITEs) to offer mutual funds o f  domestic equities to overseas
investors. In 1988, the government promulgated the Securities and Exchange Law
Amendments (SELA) to fiirther deepen and liberalize Taiwan’s security market. The
SEL A aims to improve several major areas o f  the SEL, such as the scope o f operation,
the criteria o f  issuing, and the requirements o f entry, which affects over one-third o f the
SEL’s provisions. The SELA continues to carry out the second stage o f  financial
liberalization toward the entry o f overseas investors. It opens the door for foreign
security firms and financial institutions to enter the domestic security business, acquire
the ownership o f  domestic security companies, and operate in the areas of
underwriting, dealing, and brokering. The SELA also permits the new entry o f
domestic security firms into the security industry by enacting the criteria for new
entrants. In addition, the SELA equips security firms with broader and greater powers
by allowing them to engage separately or concurrently in any combination o f  the
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underwriting, dealing, and brokering functions. Prior to the SELA, security firms were 
licensed to engage in only one o f those operations.
Another major revision is to liberalize the system of margin transactions; security 
firms are permitted to engage in these transactions directly or act as an agent for such 
transactions. Before the SELA, these activities had been the legal monopoly o f Fuh 
Hwa Securities Corporation since its inception in 1980. The third stage of the 
internationalization o f the security market was realized by allowing foreign security 
firms to establish representative offices and branches in 1991.
Capital market integrity is another important objective of capital market reform. 
Capital market integrity is crucial to the efficiency and growth o f the security market 
because without it, investors may shun away from the capital market for other financial 
segments, causing among other things, the trading on the secondary market to be less 
liquid, and the issuing o f  securities in the primary market to be more expensive for 
issuers as investors would want a discount to compensate for the higher liquidity risk 
in the secondary market. In order to encourage public participation and enlarge the 
scale o f the security market, the SELA contains provisions emphasizing the areas o f 
shareholder diversification, capital structure o f  issuers, and disclosure requirements. 
The SELA requires the issuing companies to offer at least a certain percentage o f  the
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shares to the public in order to broaden the holding bases. Those provisions apply to all 
shares issued regardless o f  whether or not they are listed and traded on Taiwan Stock 
Exchange (TSE) or OTC. The SELA also enables the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) to limit the percentage of the net capital increases a company 
otherwise would obtain to prevent the illusory increases in the capitalization o f a 
company. Most important o f all, the SELA requires more extensive and continuous 
disclosure in the areas o f  financial and operational conditions o f  a company, the 
holding positions o f its major shareholders, directors, supervisors, and managers, and 
its major acquiring and transferring transactions. These measures were enacted in 
order to deter the occurrence o f such events as insider trades and manipulative 
practices.
3.2.4. Outcomes of the Reform on the Security Market
Prior to the 1988 SELA, there were twenty-eight brokers, ten dealers, and 
twenty-two underwriters. However, pursuant to the SELA, the entry restrictions were 
liberalized, and there was considerable entry into the various segments o f  the securities 
business.
32
Table 3.3 Development of Stock Market
1965 1975 1985 1990 1995 20(K)
No. o f  Listed
Com panies 37 68 127 199 347 531
No. o f  Shares
L isted^ 529 3 .458 21.345 50.643 132.642 363.018
Total P ar Value** 8.950 29.069 213.449 506.425 1.342.619 3.630.183
Total M arket
Value** 27.070 73.959 415.706 2.681.911 5.108.437 8.191.474
T rad ing  Volume* 477 6.645 14.5.33 232.306 267.297 630.868
T rad ing  Value** 10.960 13 0 J 3 6 195.227 19.031.288 10.151.535 30.526_566
W eighted Inde.x 317.48 745.62 6775.32 5543.75 7847.21
Stock Population*** 3.337 6.829
(A s % o f Total
Households) 51.49 100
* million shares ** NTSmillion *** million
Note: source: Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
Pursuant to the permissive SELA, the number o f  brokers who buy and sell 
securities on behalf o f  clients increased dramatically. In 1990, two years after the 
SELA, the number o f licensed brokers quickly reached its peak at 373. This number 
was more than the 199 companies listed on TSE, the shares o f which they broker for 
clients. Inasmuch as the conditions in the security industry has not been conducive for 
brokers to earn substantial brokerage commissions from large volumes o f transactions, 
most brokerage firms have lost money. As a result, the number o f  firms has steadily 
declined to 158 at the end o f 2000 as the industry has undergone significant 
reconstruction.
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The security firms licensed to deal with their own accounts were tallied at 37 at 
the end o f  1990. Even encountering the same detrimental aggregate conditions as the 
brokers, the number o f dealers continued to grow in a steady fashion and arrived at 105 
as o f 2000. However, many of these licensed dealers were affiliated with one or more 
listed companies, and holding but not trading the shares o f  their affiliates became their 
main function. In order to improve the market stagnation, the SEC decreed in 1992 that 
the licenses o f security dealers will be revoked in the event that they fail to trade 
securities in a fifteen-day period.
The development for the underwriters is similar to that o f the dealers. The 
security firms with underwriting licenses gradually climbed to 75 at the end o f  2000. 
Underwriting by these firms is generally done on a best-effort rather than a 
firm-commitment basis. The former entails prospective investors to submit their offers 
to purchase shares by conventional mail. In the event o f oversubscription, a 
computer-assisted lottery system allocates the shares in order to ensure that all 
subscribers enjoy fair and equal opportunities.
Prior to the SELA, there were 163 listed companies on TSE. That number 
increased rapidly through the 1990s and approached 531 at the end o f 2000. The 
market value o f the security market accumulated to NTS8.2 trillion in 2000 from
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NTS3.4 trillion in 1988. The trading value fluctuated dramatically from year to year. 
From 1988 to 1989, the trading value in Taiwan had more than tripled from US$298 
billion to US$970 billion, and was ranked third in the world, only trailing the United 
States (US$2431 billion) and Japan (US$1542 billion) in 1989. However, the trading 
value took a freefall after the crash o f the stock market in 1991. It hit the bottom with 
only US$211 billion in 1992, but gradually recovered and surpassed its previous peak 
with US$1330 billion in 1997.-
Taiwan also boasts one o f the most active security markets in the world in terms 
o f trading volume from 1987 onwards. On average, there are more than 2 billion shares 
changing hands each day in recent years. This unique and special characteristic o f 
Taiwan’s security market is in large part caused by the composition o f  the investors. In 
terms o f  the shares o f capital, individual investors account for more than 50% o f the 
market value, while the government and private institutions account for around 10% 
and 20%, respectively. According to the report released by the SEC, there were more 
than 12 million accounts and 7 million investors registered on TSE. The number o f  
investors not only accounted for over 43% o f  the adult (18 years old and above) 
population, but also was larger than the number o f  households (6.7 millions) in 2000.
Sources: Taiwan Securities and Exchange Commission.
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3.2 J . Reform of the Insurance Industry
Before 1961, all insurance companies in Taiwan were run by the state. Between 
1961 and 1963, the government temporarily lifted the ban on the formation o f privately 
owned insurance companies. From 1986 through 1987, three American insurance 
companies were allowed to operate a full-range program due to the pressure stemming 
from the US and the lack o f  competition in the domestic market. In 1992, the 
government enunciated the Insurance Law Amendments (ILA) to lift the ban on the 
entry o f new insurance firms, to expand the business power o f the companies, and to 
promote more competition in the market. Additional provisions were added in 1993 to 
further allow domestic insurance firms to invest overseas and for non-US foreign 
insurance companies to enter Taiwan’s market.
3.2.6. Development of the Insurance Industry
Since the passing of the ILA in 1992, the government has granted 12 licenses to 
life insurance companies and 5 to property and casualty companies, respectively. Even 
though the market shares o f  the insurance industry in the overall financial system are 
still insignificant after the reform, they did grow from 2.1% to 5.2% in deposits, and 
from 1.9% to 4.9% in loans and investments from the 1980s to 1990s, correspondingly.
However, Taiwan’s insurance industry is still underdeveloped with only 32% o f its
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population insured, compared to 160% in the US and 360% in Japan.
3.3. Income Distribution
According to the hypothesis proposed by Kuznets (1955), the income inequality 
o f a country would rise during the stage o f take-off, then stabilize around the middle 
stage, and finally start to fall by the stage o f  maturity. Contrary to his theory, Taiwan’s 
income inequality, based on two most commonly accepted measures: Gini coefficients 
and ratios o f the top quintile’s income share to the bottom quintile's income share, 
improved drastically from 55.8 to 29.02 and from 8.37 to 4.49, respectively, during 
1953-1972, while the economy grew at a rate o f  8.6% per year. During the 1970s, 
despite facing two oil crises, Taiwan’s economy continued to shine in both the growth 
and the income equality categories. While it led all LDCs and developed countries 
(DCs) with an average annual growth rate o f 10.2%, its income inequality consistently 
declined to 27.76 in Gini coefficient and to 4.14 in ratio of income shares. For this very 
reason, Taiwan’s economic development has been considered by many economists as a 
miracle and role model for other developing countries to follow. However, just when 
Taiwan’s economy crossed the border o f middle and mature stages, Taiwan saw its 
income inequality take a reverse trend, rising gradually ever since 1980. In 1993, its 
Gini coefficient climbed to 30.78 and its ratio o f  income
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Table 3.4 Income Inequality Index of Taiwan
Year Gini Coefficients* Ratios of Income of 
Highest 20% to that 
of Lowest 20%**
Ratios of Income of 
Highest 10% to that 
of Lowest 10%**
1953 55.80
I960 44.00
1964 32.24 5.33
1966 32.43
1968 28.90 5.28
1970 29.42 4.58
1972 29.02 4.49
1974 28.09 4.37
1976 28.40 4.18 16.09
1977 28.00 4.21 14.43
1978 28.43 4.18 14.21
1979 27.70 4.34 15.74
1980 27.96 4.17 15.77
1981 28.15 4.21 15.82
1982 28.51 4.29 15.44
1983 28.45 4.36 17.14
1984 28.81 4.40 15.16
1985 29.20 4.50 15.14
1986 29.29 4.60 16.96
1987 29.65 4.69 15.99
1988 30.02 4.85 16.26
1989 30.41 4.94 15.98
1990 30.11 5.18 19.28
1991 30.49 4.97 18.04
1992 31.20 5.24 19.41
1993 31.60 5.42 19.35
1994 31.80 5.38 21.06
1995 31.70 5.34 23.93
1996 31.70 5.38 24.38
1997 3200 5.41 23.72
1998 3240 5.51 33.07
1999 3250 5.50 4217
* source: Deininger (1996) ** source: DGBAS
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shares reached a thirty-year high at 5.34. which is worse than the previous record o f  
5.33 posted in 1964.
Since the increasing income inequality has become a ubiquitous economic and 
political concern globally, a great deal o f  literature has been devoted to exploring the 
possible causes. However, most o f those studies are focusing on the development o f  
income inequality in the OECD countries. Due to the differences in economic 
fundamentals, demographic conditions, and education systems between NICs and 
OECD countries, those studies could hardly apply to NICs without significant 
adjustment. For example, unlike in the US, the immigration and demographic aspects 
have never been an issue for the income inequality in Taiwan. Except for less than 2% 
o f aborigines who mostly live in mountain areas, Taiwan’s population is unanimously 
composed o f  Chinese descents. As for immigration, there is no major immigration 
influx that is big enough to affect the labor market and the composition o f the 
population since the introduction o f  foreign labors. Taiwan’s education system is an 
amalgamation o f  those o f the US and western Europe. On one hand, like most o f  
western European countries, education is free in Taiwan through 12'"^  grade and for 
post-graduate study. On the other hand, like the US, Taiwan supports the universal 
education system in which college education is available to all those who desire to
attend. Even though college education in Taiwan is not free, the cost to attend college
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is relatively affordable compared with its per capita income. For example, the cost to 
attend a private university and the cost to attend a public university for one year were 
USS850 and US$300, respectively, while per capita income was USS7413 in 1990. 
Therefore, the credit restriction in education pursuit is not a significant cause o f 
income inequality in Taiwan’s case.
Another distinguished difference between NICs and OECD countries is the 
macroeconomic settings o f the occurrence o f  the rising income inequality. A great deal 
o f economists in OECD countries blame the rising income inequality on the slow 
economic growth, but their argument could not explain why the equality o f  income is 
falling in Taiwan while its economy grows at a rate of over 8%  per annum.
Due to the aforementioned conditions that vary from country to country, and from 
development stage to development stage, it is imperative to approach the problems o f 
income inequality on a country-specific basis in order to resolve them more effectively 
and properly.
3.4. Conclusion
When immersing in the glory o f  its rapid economic growth, Taiwan also has to 
confront several formidable challenges stemming from rising income inequality and
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urgency for financial reform. Since both theoretical and empirical studies agree that 
financial development and income equality have a positive effect on economic growth, 
it is vital for the financial reform and the endeavor in abating income inequality to 
succeed in order to lift Taiwan from its current economic slump as well as lay down a 
solid foundation for its future development. Therefore, it becomes an important and 
crucial task for policy makers and economists to identify the specific causes and come 
up with adequate solutions to ensure the success o f their efforts in reducing income 
inequality and liberalizing the financial system for Taiwan’s economy.
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Chapter 4 
Theoretical Model
4.1. Introduction
This chapter will develop a general equilibrium model, which examines how the 
changes in the financial system caused by the liberalization measures have affected the 
distribution o f  income through the channels o f investment. Since the financial 
development, income distribution and other principle economic behaviors are based on 
the characteristics specific to NICs in general, and to Taiwan in particular, the 
theoretical model reflects these attributes concurrently. They include a near full 
employment, a uniform distribution o f  human capital, a rapid growth in savings and 
deposits, an increase in the share o f non banking system compared to that o f  banking 
system, an increasing influence o f  the fast growing security market on income, and the 
propensity o f  people to leave a large percentage o f their wealth to their progenies, in 
spite o f  the underdevelopment o f  the financial system. In addition, these characteristics 
are expected to further the interrelations among financial behaviors as well as other 
economic areas.
The general framework o f  this paper is derived from the theory o f  incomplete
financial markets and the neoclassical theory o f growth under altruism. However, it is
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further modified to address the specific economic characteristics o f the 
macroeconomic environment, the financial system, the investment behavior, and the 
intergenerational altruism in Taiwan, without conflict with the essential attributes o f 
the model. In our model, we consider a small open economy comprised o f a stationary 
population. Each agent has one progeny and generations succeed each other ad 
infinitum. Agents live for one period during which they invest or work. In addition, 
individuals are assumed to be risk neutral and have identical preferences and labor 
endowments, deriving utility from consumption and bequest. The only source o f  
heterogeneity among individuals is assumed to be their initial wealth endowments 
from their parents. In this economy, a single composite good, which can be used for 
either consumption or investment, is produced. There are two channels how an agent 
can participate in the process o f  production. He can choose to work in the backward 
sector and earn a deterministic wage. Alternatively, he can launch his own 
entrepreneurial venture in the modern sector that requires a fixed initial capital 
investment and gives a higher expected return. Other than investing in entrepreneurial 
activity, an agent can also invest his capital in secured financial assets and earn a lower, 
but fixed return. This model shows that in the face o f  credit market imperfections, the 
distribution o f wealth affects not only aggregate economic growth but also individual's 
future income. Furthermore, it demonstrates that in the presence o f  indivisibilities in
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the capital requirement o f  entrepreneurial activity, these effects are carried to the long 
run as well.
The remainder o f  this chapter is organized as follows. In section 2, the basic 
analytic model is outlined to pave the way for our examination of the relationships o f 
the principal economic variables—financial development, economic growth, and 
income distribution—we focus on. In section 3, we investigate how the development of 
the financial market affects the income distribution and the economic growth under the 
regime o f a perfect credit market. Section 4 characterizes the interactions among those 
three economic behaviors under the regime o f an imperfect credit market. Concluding 
observations are presented in section 5.
4.2. The Basic Model
4.2.1. Demographics and Preferences
The economy is assumed to consist o f a  large number o f agents L with identical 
preferences and labor endowments who are active for one period. Each agent has exact 
one offspring so that there is no population growth. For each generation, the only 
source o f heterogeneity among individuals is their initial wealth endowments from 
their parents. The distribution o f wealth endowments at the beginning o f  time t is
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defined by:
where <t>: R+—>[0,1| and w, is the wealth level. Agents derive utility from both 
consumption and bequests. We assume that parents are altruistically concerned about 
the well being o f their offspring so that they gain utility from the bequests per se, not 
from the offspring’s utility drawn from the bequests. Formally, the utility function o f a 
representative individual o f generation t is given as follows:
(2) U =U (Cr'6 ,)  =  C  + ( ' 6 ,  w ith0<a<l
subject to
(3) y,=c+b,
where Ct is the consumption o f an agent who lives in period t, bt is the bequest he leaves 
to his progeny, ( 1 -a) is the saving rate, and yt is the income. An individual can employ 
his endowed indivisible one unit o f labor inelastically in one o f the following two 
production activities at no disutility cost. First, he can use it to serve as a  wage-earning 
worker in the backward sector and receive a prevailing market equilibrium wage 
Secondly, he can invest it in the entrepreneurial activity T that requires a  fixed initial
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capital outlay [, and earn an opulent but risky return Ri.t, which is randomly distributed 
with density function o f  p(Rt.t). Its range is supposed to be subset of [ - l ," l ,  which 
means that there is no marginal transaction. Except for the risky asset for the 
entrepreneurial activity, agents can invest his capital in a secured asset and earn a lower 
but steady return rs.t. Agents are assumed to be risk neutral toward investment choices.
4.2.2. Aggregate Production
Consider that a single composite good is produced in this economy. The good can 
be used for either consumption or investment. The good can be produced by two 
technologies, one modern which requires entrepreneurial endeavor and capital and the 
other outdated using labor only. Production in the modern sector as a whole is denoted 
by:
(4) Y ,  =  F ^ K , L J
where Yt is the output in this sector at time t, kt is the amount o f  capital and Le.t is labor
input. F(kt,Le.t) is a concave production function with constant return to scale with
respect to aggregate capital and labor inputs kt and Le.t. It is presumed that both the
capital investment and the entrepreneurial endeavor are committed in the beginning o f
the period. For the sake o f  tractability, we postulate that there are no adjustment costs
to investment and no depreciation o f  capital. By assuming that k t= I» 0  and Le.t=I,
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furthermore, we obtain the Leontief production function for a representative 
entrepreneurial activity at the individual level:
(5) X = ^ / ( / 4 ) = / ? r
where ye is the expected return, r| is a project specific shock, and A is the set o f  risky 
projects. Because the production shock for an individual project is not exactly known 
and its expected value is assumed to be one, the shock does not affect the demand o f 
input factors when they are employed. Thus, the typical production function for an 
entrepreneurial project is described by:
(6) / ? , = / ( / • ! )
We assume that the expected return for any given venture at time t is presented as 
follows:
m  R , M  R , *  R , .
Production in the backward sector is denoted by:
<8) Y . . =  A . ‘ L
where Yn.t andLn.t are the output and labor input in this sector, respectively, and X„>0 is
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the marginal productivity.
4.3. Wealth Distribution In The Presence Of A Perfect Capital Market
4.3.1. Short Run Equilibrium
In this section, we extend the basic set-up developed in the previous section to 
analyze both the short and long term effects o f the financial system on income 
distribution and economic growth in the presence o f a perfect credit market. It is 
assumed that there is no transaction friction and information asymmetry in the capital 
market and that the equilibrium interest rate is determined by the equalization o f 
supply o f and demand for credit. Since the main objective o f our study is to explore the 
income and growth effect o f wealth distribution through the channel o f investment, we 
will limit our discussion to the financial market without consumption loans while no 
qualitative result is compromised.
We now turn to describe individual optimal decisions under the assumption o f  a 
perfect capital market. Consider an individual who inherits an amount o f w, from 
his/her parent in the beginning of time t. If he/she decides to work in the backward 
sector and not engage in entrepreneurial activity, he/she becomes a lender with lifetime 
income:
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and lifetime utility:
(10) ( /«  ( W r)= ios[ A , + w , ( ) + r , j )  1+^
where E=aioga+(I-a)iog(l-a).‘ This labor provider leaves his (her) progeny a bequest 
o f size:
O ' )  ( W , )  = (  '  - a )  = (  '  - a ) [  A n  +  W ,  ( '  +  r ,. ,) I
By choosing to launch his/her own entrepreneurial venture, an individual earns 
expected lifetime income:
(12) > ^ /w ,) = /? r ^ - ^ ( w ,- ^ ) ( ' + r,.,)
and expected lifetime utility:
(13) ( / , (  Wr)='ogt Rrs  + (Wr -  ^)C + r j  l+G
This entrepreneur bestows his/her offspring with a bequest o f  size:
(14) ^ ^ ( w ,) = ( i - a ) y ^ = ( i - a ) [  Æ r^ + (W r-^ ) ( '+ n ^ )
‘ The Cobb-Douglas preference is adopted for the utility function in the analysis. For the detailed 
explanation, see appendix 1.
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Since the very Incentive that a rational individual is willing to undertake an 
entrepreneurial activity is its expected return exceeds its opportunity cost—wage plus 
interest income, it is logical to assume that:
(15)
Combine Equations (9), (12), and (15) to obtain:
(16) for all w, e  R
In other words, an individual is better off financially if he/she chooses to launch his 
(her) entrepreneurial venture under the regime o f a perfect capital market in the short 
run, regardless o f  his (her) initial wealth. Since all rational agents will try to devote 
their endowed labor and capital to the more productive modern sector, all the 
investment opportunities will be exploited and the aggregate economic growth will 
reach Pareto equilibrium.
4.3.2. Long Run Equilibrium
In this section, the long run effects o f  wealth endowment and financial 
development on income distribution and economic growth are examined in a similar 
fashion. An individual who decides to work in the backward sector and deposit his/her
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capital in secured assets leaves his/her progeny a bequest o f  size:
If this lineage stays in the backward sector generation after generation, the long run 
wealth endowment converges to
( 18) w „ = l i m  w , . ; = ( ' - “ ) A n / t * - ( i - a ) ( i  + r,) l
Agents who determine to invest in the modern sector leave their progenies a bequest o f
size:
(  1 9 )  = 6 / w , )  = ( • - « )  ( w , ) = (  '  - “ ) [  + ( w ,  -  ^ ) ( *  +  r J  I
If all their descendants remain in this sector, the long run wealth endowment converges 
to
(20) w ,= l i m w , . ; = ( * - “ )[ / ? r~ ^ ( ' + r , )  [ i - ( i -<%)(!+/-,)!
From Equation (16), it is straightforward to show that is greater than or 
equal to yy^. Hence lineages remaining in the modem sector are better off than those 
remaining in the backward sector in the long run as well. Assuming that individuals are 
rational, they certainly will prefer investing in the more profitable entrepreneurial
■ For the derivation, see appendix 2.
 ^It is derived in the same manner as equation (18).
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venture to working in the backward sector. As a result, all investment opportunities 
will be exploited and the growth potential o f  aggregate output will be fully realized.
4.4. Wealth Distribution In The Presence Of An Imperfect Capital Market
In this section, we continue to investigate how wealth endowment and financial 
development affect the behaviors o f income distribution and economic growth under 
the regime of an imperfect capital market. It is assumed that there exist transaction 
friction and information asymmetry in the credit market so that borrowers have to pay 
a higher than market equilibrium interest rate to cover monitoring cost and default risk. 
As a result, an individual who borrows an amount o f  m pays lenders an interest rate i^, 
which covers the market clearance interest rate r ,^ and the monitoring cost and risk 
premium z, is denoted by:
( 2 1 )  / M X /  =mx.f- 4 - zi’m f
Lenders choose z to be high enough to deter any possible evasion:
(22) m (l+ /^ )= p z
This is an incentive compatibility constraint. Equations (21) and (22) determine im:
(23) /,„= i= (l+px/.^)/(P-l)>
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The borrowing interest rate i is, therefore, independent o f the amount m borrowed, as 
monitoring cost and risk premium rise with the amount m borrowed. This result is 
quite intuitive: as the amount m borrowed increases, the incentive to default rises and 
hence monitoring cost and risk premium rise.
4.4.1. Short Run Equilibrium
We now turn our attention to describe individual optimal decisions under the 
regime o f an imperfect capital market. Consider an individual who inherits an amount 
o f  W[ in the beginning o f  time t. If this person decides to work in the backward sector 
and not launch an entrepreneurial venture, he/she procures lifetime income:
(24) Wr + r J
and lifetime utility:
(25) U n ^ W )  =*°S[ Xn + + r  J
This agent is a lender who leaves a bequest o f  size:
An individual with wealth endowment more than I, who invests in an
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entrepreneurial venture in the modern sector, is a lender with lifetime income:
(27)
and lifetime utility;
(28) C / / W r ) = ' ° g [ -/)(! + r J  l+E
This entrepreneur bestows his/her offspring with a bequest o f  size:
(29) /7 /w ,)=(•-“ ) J / W , )= ( '-“ )[ /?r^ + (W ,-^)(‘ + rv^) I
As for those who succeed less than I and decide to undertake the entrepreneurial 
activity, they become borrowers and their lifetime income and utility are:
(30) = +
( 3  I )  f / , (  W , ) = 'O g [  R r j  +  ( W ,  “  ^ ) ( l  +  0  1
They leave their offspring with a bequest o f  size:
(32) ” ( * iX/Wf) =( • -( )^[ R r j + (w, “  ^ )(*+ 0  J
A rational agent with inheritance less than I will only choose to undertake an
entrepreneurial project as long as the expected gain o f  the venture outweighs the
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opportunity cost—wage and interest income, i.e., Ue(Wt)GU„(Wi). Let denote the 
initial wealth endowment o f  an individual in time t who is indifferent between 
borrowing and lending, we have:
(33) R , ,  + (w , -  /)(( + '■) =À n  + w , (• + r J
The L.H.S. is the expected income from being a borrower, the R.H.S. is the expected 
income from being a lender. Rearranging Equation (33), we obtain:
Individuals who succeed an amount smaller than ^  would prefer not to 
participate in the entrepreneurial activity but serve as a labor provider and lender. 
Investment opportunities, therefore, is only enjoyed by those who are endowed with 
high initial wealth, due to a higher interest rate for borrowers.
The amount o f wealth an individual inherits in the beginning of the lifecycle, felly 
determines his/her decisions in regard to whether to undertake an entrepreneurial 
venture or simply work in the backward sector and how much to consume and bequest. 
The distribution o f inherited wealth 0(W() for individuals living in period t satisfies:
(35)
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where L represents the total labor available. The distribution o f (D(wJ, hence, fully 
influences economic performance in period t. It determines the amount o f  labor 
devoted to the entrepreneurial activity:
(36) L c . t = J  d4>(Y|;)
U',
and to the backward sector:
(37) Ln.t=£''d<t>(vt;,)
Thus, the distribution of wealth determines aggregate output as well as the 
macroeconomic equilibrium. This result is induced by the credit market imperfection. 
In the next subsection, we show that the indivisibilities in investment requirements for 
entrepreneurial ventures in conjunction with the imperfection o f  the capital market, 
leads to non-ergodic^ dynamics and to multiple long run wealth distributions. 
Therefore, it is essential to investigate the effect o f  wealth distribution in the short run 
as well.
4.4,2. Long Run Equilibrium
The distribution o f  wealth not only determines equilibrium in period t, but also
Ergodicity characterizes the property that the process governing the wealth distribution of a lineage 
converges to the process governing the wealth distribution of the population in the long run. Details see 
Baneijee (1991) and Hamilton ( 1994).
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determines the distribution o f  inheritance in the next period (D(Wt+,):
6 .  ( w , )  =  ( '  A , ,  +  +  r I  ' f  w , < w ,
(38) 6 / yy,)= ( I / ( r v  (w , - +  ') I '( yy,
6 / W r ) = ( *  -“ )[ R r , + ( y y ,  -  0 ( 1  +  r s J  1 *(' w ,
Agents succeeding less than ^  work in the backward sector and so do their 
descendants in all future generations. Their wealth endowment converges to a long run 
level as in the regime o f a perfect capital market.
Figure 1 illustrates the dynamic evolution o f  intergenerational wealth distribution. 
The curves bn and be describe the relationships between wealth endowments for labor 
workers and entrepreneurs, respectively. Note that yy is decided by the intersection 
o f bn and be-
Individuals succeeding an amount greater than yy  ^ but less than I invest in 
entrepreneurial venture, however, not all o f  their descendants will remain in the 
modern sector in future generations. Suppose the critical point is yy,_
’ Also see the derivation o f equation ( 18) in appendix 2.
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(39) VV„ = (!-“ )[ /? , - / ( H - / ) ] / [ l - ( l - a ) ( l+ i ) l
where is assumed to lie between and yy . Individuals succeeding an 
amount between yy^  and yy,^  may engage in entrepreneurial activity, but after 
some generations, their descendants end up working in the backward sector and their 
inheritances converge to yy^ _ . Individuals with greater than yy^ inheritance 
undertake entrepreneurial activity and so do their descendants, generation after 
generation. Their wealth converges to yy Therefore, lineages in this economy are 
concentrated in two groups in the long run: rich lineages, where all their descendants 
will be entrepreneurs who enjoy high profit modem technology, and poor ones, where 
generation after generation, work in the backward sector. The dynamics o f  the income 
distribution in the long run is illustrated by the Lorenz curve in Figure 2. The values o f 
VV„ ’ Wh ’ W, 3re represented by the slopes o f curves OA, AB, and BC, 
respectively. The downward shift o f  the Lorenz cure from <I>(Wt) to OABC indicates the 
increases in income inequality.
In this financial regime, therefore, an individual with initial wealth less than yy 
is financially repressed in the long run as well as in the short run. He/She is deprived o f 
the opportunity to enjoy the monetary prosperity o f investing in an entrepreneurial
’ For the proof, see appendix 3.
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venture that he otherwise would have had under the regime o f a perfect credit market 
in the short run. In the long run, his/her lineage will inevitably fall into poverty trap 
due to the denial o f opportunity to participate in the entrepreneurial activity generation 
after generation caused by capital market imperfection. Individuals with bequests 
between and , are financially repressed in the long run due to the 
diminishing return to their investment induced by the high borrowing interest rate.
Note that the slopes in Figure 1 are less than one at yy and yy  ^ indicates that a  
and ^  satisfy:
(40) ( l-a )( l + ^ ,)< l
This additional assumption warrants that the process o f  bequest from generation to 
generation is stable and does not explode. Another additional assumption which is 
implicit in Figure I is that enforcement costs are rather high so that the spread between 
the lending and borrowing interest rates is high too:
(41) (1 -a)( I +i)=P( 1 -a)( 1+r, )/(p-I )>( 1 -a)( 1+r, )
The long run effects o f  wealth distribution and financial infrastructure on the
aggregate output and income inequality can be derived from individual dynamics
accordingly. In the long run, the economy becomes dichotomous financially and is
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divided into two groups: rich agents with wealth level o f ^  and poor agents with 
wealth level o f  . The relative size o f these two strata is decided by the initial 
wealth distribution under the regime o f the imperfect capital market. From Equation
(39), the portion o f population work in the backward sector in the long run is described 
by:
W2)
The average wealth is:
(43 ) W  = W ,  — Ln( )/L
Since not all investment opportunities are exploited in this economy, this results 
in a lower economic growth rate. Hence, it is clear that the portion o f the population 
with initial wealth endowment greater than o r equal to is positively related to the 
long run output and wealth levels in both individual and aggregate settings.
4.5. Dynamics of the Imperfect Credit Market
In this section, we will further investigate various dynamics o f  the model under 
the regime o f  an imperfect credit market. First, we will release the assumptions o f 
fixed return and wage for investment and backward sector jobs, respectively, and
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proceed to explore how the changes o f investment return and wage will affect the 
results o f  the previous analysis. Assume that the return Rr for an entrepreneurial 
investment grows at a rate o f gr and the wage for a job in the backward sector grows at 
a rate o f g„. If g r> g n ,  then from Equations (34) and (39), we obtain:
(44) 6 w .; /5 /e ^ < 0 a n d 5 ^ /5 /^ ^ > 0 .
In other words, the relatively faster growth o f  Rr not only lowers the wealth 
threshold for investment in the short run but also reduces the portion o f  population 
falling into poverty trap. This theoretical implication concurs with the economic 
development o f  industrialized and newly industrialized countries for the past fifteen 
years. Due to the high expected returns for certain computer-related industries in the 
past fifteen years, a great deal o f  entrepreneurs with very limited initial wealth were 
able to access to those investment opportunities and successfully established their own 
enterprises. However, the increase in the investment requirement I, will lead to, ceteris 
paribus, the increases o f  both and and accordingly lower income equality. 
This observation reflects the fact that the absolute majority o f  the high tech investment 
opportunities in recent years is capital-intensive and requires a large amount o f  start-up 
cost. The net effect o f  the interaction o f the aforementioned two factors depends on 
their relative magnitudes. In our model, it is straightforward that the factor growing
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faster will dominate the outcome. If they both vary at the sam e rate, they will have no 
effect on the values o f  and , and in turn, the income distribution and 
economic growth remain unchanged.
As for the variation o f  the borrowing interest rate, the observations derived from 
our model are; 5 /0i>0 and 5 /5i<0, which are concert with the general
conception that higher interest rates for loans discourage investments and consequently 
deter economic development and worsen income inequality.
Another specific assumption in the basic model is that the motivation o f 
intergenerational altruistic bequest is modeled as utility from the size o f bequest. The 
alternative way to construct this motivation, as mentioned in the previous sections, is 
to assume that parent’s utility depends on the utility that his o r her progeny derived 
from the bequest instead o f  the size o f  it. As long as the borrowing interest rate is 
higher than the lending interest rate and investment is non-convex, the basic results o f  
this study hold; there are lineages remaining poor if their initial wealth is relatively 
small.
The outcome o f  this paper also holds subject to the assumption that wages and 
returns are variable to the skill level and the investment characteristics, respectively.
Assume that and Rr are random but bounded, then the qualitative results are verified
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as follows: lineages with low initial wealth will never invest in entrepreneurial venture 
and remain poor, and rich lineages will invest in entrepreneurial venture and remain 
rich. There is some intermediate range in which lineages fluctuate between those two 
sectors. Therefore, initial wealth distribution does affect the economy both in the short 
run and in the long run, even as labor skills and expected investment returns are 
heterogeneous.
4.6. Conclusion
The theoretical model developed in this chapter is designed to analyze the effects 
o f  financial development and socioeconomic status on income distribution and 
economic growth through the channels o f  investments. Even though the model is 
premised on earlier studies on the relationships among economic growth, financial 
development, and income inequality, it is distinctive from those traditional studies on 
two fronts. The most salient one is that it is based particularly on the various 
macroeconomic and microeconomic characteristics o f  the NICs and Taiwan. Another 
distinctive feature is that this study introduces uncertainty into the model by assuming 
that there are two primary assets, one safe with fixed and stable income, and one risky 
with higher expected return. The model shows that the financial development in 
conjunction with the initial socioeconomic status determines both the short- and
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long-run income distribution and aggregate output. In the presence o f an imperfect 
capital market, agents with less than the threshold initial wealth are financially 
repressed both in the short- and long-run. Since not all the available investment 
opportunities are exploited under the regime o f an imperfect capital market, this leads 
to lower economic growth than under the regime o f  a perfect capital market in the short 
term. In the long term, the economy not only experiences a slower average growth rate 
but also becomes financially dichotomous.
The policy implication derived from our model is that without government 
intervention, a country with a large middle class or more equality would experience a 
higher economic growth and lower income inequality as the financial liberalization 
progresses. For a less equalitarian country, the government has to delicately and 
carefully balance between the necessity o f financial liberalization and the prevention 
o f its side effect on income inequality in order to achieve a steady and sustainable 
growth in the long run. Since it has proven by the incidences occurring in U.S. and 
other nations that there isn’t a perfect capital market in the world at all, proper 
regulation and monitoring is needed to maintain the principal function o f  the financial 
market—facilitating investments—instead o f encouraging speculation and
manipulation.
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Even though this model may have limitations to explain the entire complexity o f  
the real world due to many strict assumptions and simplifications, it is expected to 
provide good intuitive understanding o f the interactions o f the financial behaviors, 
income distribution, and economic growth in Taiwan as well as in other NICs.
66
Chapter Five 
Empirical Test
5.1. Introduction
The development o f  the financial system and the dynamics o f  the income 
distribution in Taiwan were analyzed descriptively in Chapter Three. Several 
predominant aspects characterizing Taiwan’s financial system and income inequality 
were presented in the analysis: dualism of the financial system, high saving rate, rapid 
expansion o f  the security market, and increasing income inequality. In Chapter Four, 
theoretical models were developed according to those characteristics to investigate the 
relationships among financial behaviors, income distribution and economic growth. 
The theoretical models emphasize how the development o f financial system in 
conjunction with the initial wealth distribution affects the future income equality and 
economic growth. These models also show how the interactions o f  investment 
requirement, return rate and borrowing interest rate influence the overall output level 
and the distribution o f  output to different sectors.
In this chapter, based on the descriptive and theoretical analyses, empirical tests 
are carried out on the hypotheses o f  financial development, income inequality,
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investment and economic growth. Important implications to be tested are: (i) how the 
financial system influences the per capita output before and after the financial reform, 
(ii) how the dynamics o f the security market and the banking system affect the income 
inequality and economic development, (iii) whether the increasing income inequality 
is caused by the increasing shares o f  top income quintiles or by the decreasing shares 
o f low income quintiles.
The formulation and development o f the empirical tests on those three 
implications are discussed in the next section. The analysis o f the data employed in the 
tests is presented in section three. The test results are evaluated in section four and 
conclusion marks are given in section five.
5.2. Econometric Models
In this section, econometric models are developed to estimate the relationships 
among financial advancement, income inequality, and economic development, and to 
test the relevant hypotheses suggested in the previous chapters. For the purpose o f 
estimation, it is necessary to convert the theoretical implications based on micro 
foundation into the econometric specifications delineated by macroeconomic 
relationships. In other words, statistical estimations on income, investment, savings,
and production will be computed on a macroeconomic level, which is the entire
68
Taiwan’s economy.
Two systems of equations are presented in this section to examine the various 
economic implications derived in the theoretical models. The first system o f the 
equations is devoted to the study o f the relationships between average income level 
and several yearly financial indices such as the capitalization o f the stock market, the 
increase o f  capital invested in the stock market, and the amount o f loan advanced. The 
specification o f  the empirical equations in this group is based on the variables and 
relationships suggested in our theoretical models as well as those in the studies o f Wu 
(1996), and Li and Zou (2000). Since the theoretical models contain strict assumptions 
and are simplified to facilitate the investigation o f  the relationships among the 
variables, the equations may miss some factors from a practical point o f view.
The basic form o f the equations that estimate the relationships between income 
level and various financial variables is defined as follows:
( I ) PCIt =  a, +  aixSM V Rt +  asxSCINRt +  a^xLONARt +  Ut
where PCL: Per capita real income for time t.
SMVRii Ratio o f nominal stock market capitalization to nominal GNP.
SCINRt: Ratio o f  nominal capital increase in security market to nominal GNP.
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LOANRt: Ratio o f nominal loan to nominal GNP.
The second set o f equations is derived from the theoretical models in Chapter 4 and 
the studies o f Berggren (1999), and Li and Zou (2000), and aims at testing the effects 
o f financial behaviors on income inequality and economic development. In addition, 
the concept o f inverted-U shape relationship between development level and income 
inequality suggested by the Kuznets’ hypothesis is incorporated in the equations 
through the quadratic form as well. They are expressed as follows:
(2) GINIt = b,., + bi.2xSMVR, + bijxSCINR, + bi.axLOANRt + bisxPCIt
+ b i.ôxpcir + £i.t
(3) INS20, = b:.i + bzzxSMVR, + bzjxSCINR, + b:.4xLOANR, + bz^xPCI^
+ bi^xPCIt" + £2.1
(4) HI20t = b,., + b3.2xSMVRt + bs.jxSCINRt + b3.4xLOANRt +  b3.5xPCI,
+  b 3 . 5 X P C I t “  +  £3.1
(5) LO20, = b4.i + b4.2xSMVRt +  b4.3xSCINRt + b4.4xLOANRt +  b4.fxPCIt
+  b 4 . ô X P C I t "  +  £ 4 .t
where GINIt: Gini coefficient for year t.
INS20t: Ratio of the income share o f  top quintile to that o f  bottom quintile. 
HI20t: Income share o f  the top quintile.
LO20t: Income share o f the bottom quintile.
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5.3. Data
Except the Gini Coefficient data, which are obtained from the publication o f 
Deininger and Squire (1996), the remainders o f  the data employed in this study are 
collected from the database o f  Directorate General o f  Budget, Accounting and 
Statistics (DGBAS), Executive Yuan, Taiwan, R.O.C., in 2001. Even though the 
related statistics for the stock market can be traced back as far as the inception year of 
1963, only data after 1971 are considered in the empirical analysis due to the following 
two factors. First, there were very few private investments involved in the trading 
activities o f the security market in the preliminary years, hence, those indices could 
hardly reflect either the true mechanism o f the market o r the other related economic 
behaviors. Secondly, the stock market experienced drastic fluctuations from time to 
time in the early years due to its small scale. In addition, some auxiliary variables such 
as schooling information, etc., are not available before 1970. Taking into account all 
the aforementioned factors, we determine that 1972 is an adequate year to start with for 
our tests.
Gini Coefficient: A summary measure o f  the extent to which the actual 
distribution o f  income diverges from a hypothetical uniform distribution in which each 
agent receives an identical share. The best available data for Gini Coefficient so far are
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published by Deininger and Squire. Those data along with the other income 
distribution statistics will be employed in the empirical study as dependent variables.
Income Distribution: The percentage shares o f  disposable income by quintiles o f 
households published by DGBAS for the period o f  1972-1999 are adopted as the other 
dependent variables in this study as well. It is noteworthy that this statistics were 
published every two to four years by DGBAS before 1976, thus, we choose 1972 as the 
starting year in the regressions to accommodate the availability o f both income 
distribution and security market data. The data missing for 1973 and 1975 are obtained 
by calculating the average o f the values o f the previous and following years. The 
observations for the top and bottom income quintiles range from 36.80 (1980) to 39.26 
(1998) and from 7.12 (1998) to 8.96 (1977), respectively. This distribution pattern 
reveals a U-shape relationship between income inequality and development level, 
which is contrary to the hypothesis propounded by Kuznets. This phenomenon will be 
examined in detail in the following discussion.
The Level o f Development: In the model, the per capita disposable income is 
selected as the measure o f  the degree o f economic development. These data are 
computed in real term with the price index o f 1991 as the base year. From the data, we 
can observe that the per capita disposable income in Taiwan shows a rapid but steady
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growth until recent years. The variable representing per capita disposable income will 
appear in quadratic form in the regression in accordance with the Kuznets’ hypothesis.
The Level o f Financial Development: Three indicators o f the financial market are 
adopted as the measures o f  the level o f financial development and the independent 
variables in the empirical analysis. The first statistics is the ratio o f  the nominal total 
stock market capitalization to the nominal GNP (SMVR). The range o f  this ratio spans 
from 1.5332 (1989) to 0.0916 (1974). The mean values for the two sample periods, 
1972-1982 and 1983-1999, are 0.1341 and 0.7399, respectively. It clearly shows that 
the security market plays a more influential role in the macroeconomic development in 
the latter period. Except the transitional years, these ratios are relatively stable within 
the respective horizons observed. The second information taken into account in the 
analysis is the ratio o f  the nominal capital increase in stock market to the nominal GNP 
(SCINR). This ratio fluctuates less than its counterpart SMVR and ranges from 
0.00151 (1972) to 0.06285 (1986). The mean values for the two time frames are 
0 .01117 and 0.02433, respectively. Compared with the corresponding values o f  SMVR, 
it is not hard to reveal the speculation nature o f  the market; the capitalization value 
grows much faster than the actual capital increase in the market. Due to the 
imperfection o f  the market, the signs o f  these two ratios in the regressions are expected
to be negative. Another indicator adopted as the measure o f  the financial development
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is the ratio o f  total nominal loan to nominal GNP (LOANR). As expected, this value 
grows as the level o f economic development progresses and varies from 0.4519 (1972) 
to 1.8502 (1998). Throughout the entire horizon, it increases gradually and reaches the 
peak at 1998. The respective mean values for the two periods observed are 0.6332 and 
1.30114. The sign o f  the loan-GNP ratio is expected to be positive since it will ease the 
access restriction to capital for those individuals endowed with less fortunate. Note 
that while the first two variables are the measurements o f  the development o f  the stock 
market sector, the last one is the gauge o f the expansion o f the banking sector.
Average Skills: In the empirical analysis, the general education level is employed 
as the measure o f  average skills. It is the weighted average shares o f the education 
levels: primary school, middle school, high school, college, and graduate school for the 
population over the age o f fifteen years old. The mean value and range o f  the average 
education years are 9.063 and from 7.15 to 10.59, respectively. The average years o f  
education is not expected to have any significant influence on the income distribution 
due to three specific features o f  Taiwan’s education system. The first is that tfie 
expenses for various education levels are either free or low, so the credit
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TABLE 5.1 SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR 1972-1982
Number o f  
observations Mean SD Mmimiim Maximum
SMVR^ 11 0.12946 0.07827 0.061983 0.26316
SCINR'’ 11 0.00646 0.00637 0.0015117 0.02821
GROWTH 11 10.252 3.4096 1.20000 13.400
per 11 382.91 206.70 189 853
LOANR‘‘ 11 0.43621 0.05059 0.35368 0.53477
TABLE 5.2 CORRELATIOM MATRIX FOR 1972-1982
SMVR SCINR GROWTH PCI LOANR
SMVR 1.0000
SCINR 0.5461 1.0000
GROWTH 0.2635 0.0539 1.0000
PCI -0.2177 -0.0342 -0.4848 1.0000
LOANR -0.3967 -0.1584 -0.4398 0.9529 1.0000
SMVR: the ratio of stock market capitalization to GNP 
SCINR: the ratio of capital increase to GNP 
PCI: nominal per capita income 
t  LOANR: the ratio of total loan to GNP
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TABLE 5.3 SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR 1983-1999
Number o f  
observations Mean SD Minimum Maximum
SMVR 17 0.34620 0.38806 0.10690 1.5322
SCINR 17 0.01495 0.01293 0.00625 0.06285
GROWTH 17 8.7294 3.2291 4.10000 14.000
PCI 17 3452.4 2340.1 890 8189
LOANR 17 0.8089 0.18728 0.63280 1.2561
TABLE 5.4 CORRELATION MATRIX FOR 1983-1999
SMVR SCINR GROWTH PCI LOANR
SMVR 1.0000
SCINR 0.0029 1.0000
GROWTH -0.0919 0.3096 1.0000
PCI 0.7884 0.1013 -0.1698 1.0000
LOANR 0.7448 -0.0278 -0.2816 0.9435 1.0000
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restriction on education pursuit is not a substantial cause o f  income inequality.
Another feature is that here is no entrance requirement through 12'*" grade and the 
admissions to college and graduate school are solely based on the scores o f  the 
entrance examination, thus there is no human subjective preference or corruption 
involved. Lastly, Chinese people overwhelmingly emphasize the importance o f 
education and parents will do everything they could to encourage and facilitate their 
children in education pursuit regardless o f their income levels and occupations.
5.4. Results
In order to investigate the impact o f  financial development and reform on income 
distribution and economic growth, we divide the period o f  1972-1999 in the study into 
two time frames, 1972-1982 and 1983-1999, according to the progression o f  Taiwan’s 
financial development and the dividing criteria proposed by Wu (1996). The former 
time frame o f 1972-1982 represents the pre-reform era and the latter one o f  1983-1999 
represents the period o f  reform, which continues as o f  1999. All o f  the regression 
equations are estimated by ordinary least squares (OLS) method for the two sample 
data.
Table 5.5 reports the regression results for the first set o f equations. Columns
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(i)-(v) in the table are based on the data for 1972-1982, and columns (vi)-(x) are based 
on the data for 1983-1999. The most noticeable result is the effects o f the stock market 
variables on per capita GNP. In the first period, the loan-GNP ratio is the only 
independent variable with significant coefficient at 1% level in all equations it involves. 
The investment-GNP ratio is only significant at 5% level when the control variable 
loan-GNP ratio is included in the regression. However, all three variables show 
significant impact on per capita income except SMVR in column 6 for the second 
period. When the coefficient o f SCINR is estimated without any controlling variable, it 
is significant at 2.5% level; while LOANR is included in the regression, SCINR 
becomes insignificant. However, the absolute value o f SCINR in column 10 is still 
much larger than the corresponding coefficient in column 5. It shows the closer 
relationship between income level and stock market development. As for the 
coefficient o f  SMVR, it is not significant in both columns (i) and (vi). Like the 
coefficient o f  SCINR, the absolute value o f SMVR in the second period is larger than 
the corresponding ones for the first period. All o f the coefficients but one display the 
expected sign in the direction they affect income level. Another feature is that the R‘ 
values in the second sample are, in general, higher than those for the earlier sample. 
This findings in the regression are consistent with those published by Wu (1996), etc.
Verifying the increasing influence o f  financial system, both stock market and
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TABLE 5.5 FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND ECONOMIC GROWTH
Independent Variable: Per Capita Income
1972-1982 1983-1999
/ 2 3 4 5 / 2 3 4 5
CONST. 457.34 375.76 -1315.4 -1515.1 -1408.6 668.47 312.77 -1590.6 -1692.5 -1549.6
(128.4)“ (95.8) (181.1) (186.1) (156.8) (361.9) (219.3) (240.7) (273.7) (244.7)
SMVR -574.91 502.80" 581.72 734.03'
at (859.2) (251.9) (2456) (901.5)
SCINR
a;
11.06
(10.39)
61.47"
(27.56)
480.77"
(198.5)
94.63’
(97.02)
LOANR 3893.2" 4201.9" 4015.8" 4502.6" 4509.0" 4259.1
at (412.7) (389.6) (348.6) (451.8) (457.1) (516.8)
R- 4.7% 0.1% 8.08% 92.34% 92.9% 3.7% 28.11% 86.0% 85.68% 85.96%
a. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors 
* Significance at 10% level 
** Sieniflcance at 5% level
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banking sectors, on the income level, we will next examine how they affect the income 
inequality and the income shares o f various quintiles. The regression results are 
reported in Tables 5.6 and 5.7. From Tables 5.6 and 5.7, we can observe that the results 
derived from 1983-1999 are more consistent with the prediction o f  the theoretical 
model than those derived from 1972-1982 due to the fact that the data quality o f and 
the number o f observations for the second period is better and larger than those for the 
first period. Another conspicuous characteristics is that the explanatory variables o f  the 
security market show a strong influence on the income inequality in the second period 
while the explanatory variable o f  the banking sector plays a larger role in the 
distribution in the first period. For the 1972-1982 data in Table 5.6, the regression on 
Gini coefficient shows that the variable o f  the market capitalization-GNP ratio is 
significantly different from zero and o f  the expected positive sign. The other two 
regressions, the capital increase-GNF ratio and the loan-GNP ratio, are o f  the expected 
sign but statistically insignificant. In the regressions for the ratio o f  top quintile income 
share to bottom quintile income share, all o f  the three regressions are insignificant and 
the signs o f  two o f  them are inconsistent with the implication o f  the theoretical model 
except the loan-GNP ratio. These results are not totally unexpected since the quality o f  
this ratio data is inferior to that o f  Gini coefficient. As for the regressions on the 
income shares o f  top quintile and bottom quintile, the only regressor, which is
s o
significant and consistent, is the loan-GNP ratio. The causes o f the aberration are also 
possibly related to the data quality and the anomaly o f the stock market. Even though 
the coefficients o f  the stock market variables are neither significant nor consistent for 
the three distribution statistics published by DGBAS, the sign o f  the banking 
coefficients are concurrent to the theoretical prediction.
In the regressions for the 1983-1999 data, the effects o f both the market 
capital ization-GNP ratio and the capital increase-GNP ratio are significantly different 
from zero at 5% and 10% levels, respectively, and are o f  the expected positive sign, i.e., 
they do contribute to the worsening o f income inequality. Even though the loan-GNP 
ratio is o f the expected sign, it is not significantly different from zero in the regressions 
for the ratio o f top quintile income share to bottom quintile income share, all three 
variables show expected sign, but none o f  them is significant. Similarly, the effects o f 
the stock market variables on the income share o f  top quintile are positive but not 
significant. The effect o f  the loan-GNP ratio is also insignificant but positively related 
to the income share o f top quintile. As expected, all o f  the three variables have negative 
impact on the income share o f the bottom quintile, however, they are not significantly 
different from zero.
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TABLE 5.6 FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND INCOME INEQUALITY
FOR 1972-1982
Constant PCI Squared SMVR 
PCI
SCINR LOANR Adjusted
R-
DW
GINI 34.21 -0.0188"
(0.0089)*'
1.3E-05* 5.9024' 
(8.6E-06) (4.563)
0.6642 1.7940
35.93 -0.0021"
(0.0094)
I.5E-05*
(9.3E-06)
0.3587
(0.5928)
0.6047 1.4597
33.413 -0.0276"
(0.0143)
1.9E-05"
(l.OE-05)
8.5832
(26.47)
0.5902 1.4611
INS20“ 6.46 -0.0061"
(0.0017)
4.3E-06" -0.5614 
(1.7E-06) (0.8831)
0.7947 1.9583
6.45 -0.0058"
(0.0017)
4. IE-06" 
(1.7E-06)
-0.0308
(0.1081)
0.7854 1.7416
4.86 -0.0077"
(0.0024)
4.8E-06"
(1.66E-06)
4.9568
(4.384)
0.8164 1.918
HI20" 46.07 -0.0225"
(0.0069)
I.7E-05" -3.7695 
(6.65E-07) (3.533)
0.6928 1.8673
45.34 -0.0208"
(0.0071)
1.6E-05"
(7.02E-06)
-0.2411
(0.4464)
0.6571 1.5613
37.46 -0.0295"
(0.0096)
1.9E-05"
(6.7E-06)
24.105'
(17.82)
0.7164 1.8385
LO20" 6.61 0.0056"
(0.0015)
-3.7E-06" 0.3181 
(1.4E-06) (0.7599)
0.8607 2.0842
6.69 0.0054"
(0.0015)
-3.5E-06"
(1.4E-06)
0.0123
(0.092)
0.8576 1.9173
8.18 0.0074"
(0.0019)
-4.3E-06"
(1.36E-06)
-4.7546
(3.617)
0.8855 2.0952
a. The ratio of the income share of top quintile to the income share of bottom quintile
b. The income share of top quintile
c. The income share of bottom quintile
cl. Numbers in the parentheses are standard errors.
* Significance level at 10%
** Significance level at 5%
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TABLE 5.7 FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND INCOME INEQUALITY
FOR 1983-1999
Constant PCI Squared
PCI
SMVR SCINR LOANR Adjusted
R-
DW
GINI 31.07 -0.0062"
(0.00146)
2E-06"
(6.8E-07)
9.3412"
(3.618)
0.7321 1.5747
32.10 -0.0071"
(0.00164)
2.2E-06"
(7.5E-07)
0.7133*
(0.4512)
0.6601 1.0505
30.27 -0.0099"
(0.00512)
3.1E-06"
(I.5E-06)
7.3227
(11.22)
0.6067 0.9466
INS20 5.57 -0.0021"
(0.00035)
6.8E-07"
(1.6E-07)
0.5036
(0.8725)
0.8058 1.1417
5.63 -0.0021"
(0.00035)
7.0E-07"
(1.6E-07)
0.0288
(0.0975)
0.8021 1.1712
5.03 -0.0029"
(0.00099)
9.3E-07"
(2.9E-07)
2.0457
(2.191)
0.8133 1.3219
HI20 42.19 -0.0062"
(0.00135)
1.8E-06"
(6.3E-07)
0.1377
(3.352)
0.7715 1.1970
42.21 -0.0062"
(0.00135)
I.8E-06"
(6.2E-07)
0.0208
(0.3710)
0.7715 1.2044
39.65 -0.0099"
(0.00376)
2.8E-06"
(l.lE-06)
8.5597
(8.252)
0.7890 1.4014
L020 7.45 0.0024"
(0.00033)
-8.3E-07"
(I.5E-07)
-0.6244
(0.8231)
0.8371 1.2518
0.0024" 8.0E-07" -0.0213 0.8306 1.2719
(0.00033) (1.6E-07) (0.0929)
7.87 0.0031"
(0.00096)
I.OE-06"
(2.8E-07)
-1.7286
(2.101)
0.8383 1.4227
* Significance level at 10% 
^^Significance level at 5%
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It is noteworthy that in all o f  the regressions, the results express a U-shape 
relationship between income inequality and development level, which is contradictory 
to the inverted U-shape correlation suggested by Kuznets (1955), et al. All o f  the 
coefficients for per capita GNP and squared per capita GNP are significantly different 
from zero at 5% level. Another notable phenomenon is the discrepancy o f significance 
and consistence between Gini coefficient and other inequality indices in the 
regressions. This could be caused by the inefficiency o f  the taxation mechanism so that 
a lot o f  households underreported their income during the census in order to match 
their falsely filed tax information, especially in the first period.
5.5. Sensitivity Analysis
In this subsection, we proceed to discuss the quality o f the regression results 
obtained above. The first possible econometric problem associated with the 
regressions is the autocorrelation. To investigate this problem, we examine whether the 
residuals show a particular pattern across time. From visual inspection and 
Durbin-Watson d test, we cannot reject the hypothesis that there is no positive or 
negative autocorrelation among the residuals. The second possible problem that could 
distort the results is multi-linearity. From the correlation matrices in Tables 5.2 and 5.4, 
it reveals that the links among the explanatory variables are very limited that they will
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not cause any aberration to the regression results. Third, as for heteroscedasticity, this 
problem is alleviated by a great deal as the original data set is divided into two groups 
according to the particular development stages o f  financial system.
As mentioned before, the fourth possible econometric problem is measurement 
error, given that the data collected by DGBAS in the early times are not as reliable and 
accurate as those in the latest two decades. However, we found that the results are 
robust to measurement error in INS2020. HI20, and LO20. Hence, if anything, 
measurement error would seem to bias the coefficients o f  interest against our 
hypothesis to a minor degree at most. Finally, the fifth possible problem involves the 
omission and endogeneity o f variables, i.e., how sensitive the specified regression 
models are to changes in the set o f  independent variables. In order to investigate the 
sensitivity o f the regression models, three other explanatory variables, which are 
economic growth, unemployment rate, and average years o f  schooling for population 
over 15 years old, are used in various combinations, in addition to those used in the 
regression models in Table 5.6 and Table 5.7. These three are all considered to be 
possible influence on the degree o f income inequality by a great deal o f  studies. Due to 
the unavailability o f  the data for those variables for most o f  the 1972-1982 period, the 
sensitivity test portion o f  the investigation is carried out only for the 1983-1999 period.
The results o f  48 new regressions are summarized in Table 5.8.
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TABLE 5.8 SENSITIVITY TEST FOR 1983-1999
M odel r M odel 2*^ M odel 3*^ M odel 4 ‘*
SMVR (-(-)** (+ )* * (+ )** (+ )**
GINI SCINR (+ ) (+ ) (+ ) (+ )
LOANR (+ ) (+) (+ ) (+)
SMVR (+ ) (+ ) (+ ) (+)
INS2020 SCINR (+ ) (+) (+ ) (+ )
LOANR (+ ) (+ ) (+ ) (+)
SMVR (+ ) (+ ) (+ ) (+ )
HI20 SCINR (+ )
(+ )
(-)
(-)
(-)
(+ )
(+ )
(-)
(-)
(-)
(+ )
(+ )
(-)
(-)
(-)
(+ )
(+)
(-)
{-)
f-)
LOANR
SMVR
LO20 SCINR
LOANR
a. Model I; [nequality index=a«+ai-FB'+a:.PCI+a3.PCl’+-i-aj.AYE'^+E.
b . Model 2: Inequality index= an+ai.FB+ai-PCI+aj.PCI'+aj.growth + e .
c .  Model 3: Inequality index= ad+ai-FB+ai.PCI+as.PCl’+a^.UNEM'’ + e .
d. Model 4; Inequality index= aii+ai-FB+ai.PCI+a^.PCI'+ai.growth+as.UNEM+E.
e. Signs in the parentheses are the directions of the correlations.
f. FB represents one of the three tlnancial behaviors.
g. AYE indicates average years of education.
h. UNEM represents unemployment rate.
** Sienificance at 5% level.
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A few things are clear from Table 5.8. In the first place, the changes o f  the 
regression models alter neither the directions o f  the effects o f the three principal 
explanatory variables nor the magnitude o f  the coefficients o f them on the dependent 
variables. It appears that the significant effects o f  the market capitalization-GNP ratio 
and the capital increase-GNP ratio on Gini coefficient are quite stable to theoretical 
changes in the regression models. Even though it is still insignificant, the sign o f  the 
effects o f the loan-GNP ratio on Gini coefficient does not change. For the other three 
dependent variables, the results o f the sensitivity tests are similar to those in the basic 
regression models, i.e., the effects o f  the three principal explanatory variables are not 
significantly different from zero while the signs o f them in the extended regression 
models remain the same. However, the effects o f the new explanatory variables on the 
dependent variables vary even though they are not specified in Table 5.8. Among them, 
the unemployment rate has the most significant and consistent impact on all dependent 
variables but Gini coefficient. As expected, the unemployment rate exerts negative 
effect on the income share o f bottom quintile in models 3 and 4, and positive effect on 
the INS2020 variable in model 4. Coherent with the studies o f  Persson and Tabellini 
(1994), and Alesina and Rodrik (1994), economic growth is negatively correlated to 
income inequality, however, except for the effects on the income share o f top quintile, 
the estimates o f  economic growth on the other three dependent variables are
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statistically insignificant. Average years o f schooling for the population over 15 years 
old, as predicted in the previous section, shows no significant effect on any o f those 
four dependent variables. This outcome reflects the distinctive education environment 
and cultural background in Taiwan.
In all, the results o f  the estimations are acceptable and very consistent across the 
various specifications o f  the independent variables. The adjusted coefficients of 
determination (R‘ ) are robust to changes in the regression models and assert the 
goodness o f  fit o f the equations. The DW values either reject the autocorrelation 
hypothesis or fall into the indecisive areas to further solidify the fitness o f the 
regression models. Another distinctive feature o f the regressions is that the effects o f 
the principal explanatory variables on the dependent variables are robust throughout 
the scope o f the entire estimations. The effects o f the market capitalization-GNP ratio 
on the Gini coefficient are significant at 5% level in all the regressions regardless o f 
the variations in the time horizon or in the specification. However, its effects on the 
INS2020, HI20, and LO20 are o f  the right sign but are not significant in all regressions 
except the basic ones for the 1972-1982 period. Similar to the market 
capitalization-GNP ratio, the effects o f the capital increase-GNP ratio on the Gini 
coefficient are significant at 10% level for all the tests in the 1983-1999. For all the
other dependent variables, the effects o f the capital increase-GNP ratio are o f  the right
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sign but not significant. The loan-GNP ratio expresses the similar effects as the capital 
increase-GNP ratio except that its effect on the Gini coefficient is not significant. It is 
apparent that both the per capita GNP and its square are significant at 5% level. 
Another noticeable evidence is that the unemployment rate has significant negative 
impact on the income share o f the bottom quintile. Growth is negatively related to the 
ratio o f  the top to bottom income shares with significance at 10% level. Even though 
its effects on the individual quintile are o f the right sign, negative to the top quintile, 
and positive to the bottom quintile, neither is significant. In a nutshell, those results are 
more or less compromised by the discrepancy o f  the regressions between two data 
sources, and by the deficiency o f the data quality.
5.6. Conclusion
The aim of this chapter is to provide an empirical examination o f the hypotheses 
implied in the theoretical models: the correlations among the financial behaviors, the 
income inequality, and the level o f  economic development. Some important 
hypotheses and arguments developed throughout this study are validated by the results 
o f  the empirical tests.
The relationship between the income level and the development o f the financial
system proves to grow closer and tighter as the financial reform and economic growth
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proceed. Two o f  the three financial behaviors, the capital increase-GNP and loan-GNP 
ratios, show significant effect on the income level in both periods. These results are in 
accordance with the findings o f  the majority o f the studies in the field o f economic 
development. As for the stock market capitalization-GNP ratio, its effect on the income 
level is positive but not significant. The only nuance between the effects o f these 
financial behaviors in the sampled two periods is that magnitudes in the second period 
are evidently larger than those in the first one in general.
Even though those reform measures o f the financial system as a whole do 
contribute positively to the development o f the financial system per se and to the 
growth o f  the income level, they are the likely culprits deteriorating the income 
equality in Taiwan for the past two decades. Among them, the two stock market indices 
especially display significant negative effect on the aggravation o f the income equality 
while the banking behavior shows little influence. Between the stock market 
capitalization and capital increase, the negative effect o f  the former on the income 
equality is larger in magnitude and more significant than the latter. In conjunction with 
the fact that the market capitalization shows insignificant effect on the economic 
growth, these two findings reveal the speculation nature o f  the activities o f  the stock 
market. This outcome is concurrent with the studies o f  Aghion (1999), and Arnold and
Walz (2000), which imply that the stock market-dominated economies, such as the
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United States and Britain, are usually less equalitarian in income distribution than the 
bank-dominated ones, such as France and Germany. This negative correlation between 
financial freedom and income equality is further verified by the financial turmoil 
experienced by Central and South American countries during the financial 
liberalization o f the 1980s. Even though some theoretical and empirical studies still 
argue that the liberalization o f  the financial institution is instrumental to the reduction 
o f income inequality in the longer term, recent evidences occurring across both the 
developed and newly industrialized countries prove otherwise. Among them, the most 
pronounced scenario is the crash o f the stock market and the drastic aggravation o f the 
income inequality o f the United States in the past several years. This fact demonstrates 
that even a financial market as open and efficient as the one in the United States still 
operates far from the level o f  a theoretically perfect market and is susceptible to the 
frauds o f  deceptive financial statements, insider trades, manipulative practices, and 
corruption, let alone the other economies with the similar financial system. Due to the 
effect o f  economies o f scale, financial system, especially the market-dominated one, is 
inherently asymmetrical in terms o f  the accessibility to information and resources. 
Therefore, a  liberalization measure without matching discipline and supervision is 
doomed to cause financial and economic catastrophe and to exacerbate income 
inequality. In turn, the aggravation o f income inequality, as being proven, is
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detrimental to economic growth in the long run. As a result, it is imperative to develop 
and implement corresponding regulatory and monitoring measures to come along with 
any additional liberalization policy in order to achieve long term and stable growth; 
otherwise the prosperity, if there is any, brought about by the liberalization policy is 
only specious and temporary, and the economy will suffer eventually. The financial 
turmoil o f  the United States in recent years, o f Japan in the early 1990s, and o f Central 
and South America in the 1980s and 1990s, provide the best proof. Hence, how to 
balance the progression of the financial liberalization and the related regulation and 
supervision in order to achieve the goals o f  both economic growth and income equality 
has become an essential economic and political issue for the government when 
considering further opening its market, especially for those who intent to adopting a 
market-dominated financial system.
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Chapter 6 
Conclusions and Summaries
The purpose o f this study is to analyze the effects o f  the financial development on 
the income inequality as well as on the economic growth in Taiwan since the early 
1970s. For this purpose, this study consists o f six chapters. Chapter 1, the introduction, 
presents the necessity, goals, direction, and composition o f  this study.
Chapter 2 examines earlier studies on the relationships among economic growth, 
financial development, and income inequality. It covers the pioneering studies o f  trade 
theory and Kuznets hypothesis from the 1920s to 1950s, the publications o f  the 
financial liberalization school in the 1960s and 1970s, and the endogenous growth 
models o f various em phases in the 1980s and 1990s. This chapter also discusses how 
those studies and theories are associated with the conditions o f the LDCs and what 
adjustments are needed in order to apply them to interpret the economic behaviors o f 
the LDCs.
Chapter 3 examines in detail the background and development o f  the financial 
system and the dynamics o f  the income inequality in Taiwan. In the first part, it 
discusses the financial reform, which started in the late 1970s, and its effects on the
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development o f the financial system. The correlations among the financial 
development, income inequality, and economic growth are analyzed in the second part 
o f this discussion.
In chapter 4, theoretical models are presented in order to analyze the systematic 
relationships among financial development, income inequality, and economic growth. 
Theoretically, these models are based on the endogenous financial growth models, 
which provide a microeconomic foundation for the analysis o f financial behaviors, 
income distribution, and economic growth o f  the macroeconomic level. Two basic 
models are developed to represent two financial regimes: a perfect and an imperfect 
financial market. The short- and long-term effects o f the asymmetry o f  information, 
the initial wealth distribution, and investment restriction on the income inequality and 
economic growth are investigated and compared between these two regimes.
Chapter 5 provides the results o f  empirical tests on the hypothetical implications 
implied in the previous chapter. Two econometric models are presented to carry out the 
task o f  the tests. The first model is presented to explore the relationship between 
income level and financial behaviors. Second model is developed to investigate the 
effects o f  three principal financial indicators on income distribution. In order to study 
in particular the effects o f  the financial reform and progression on the dependent
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variables, these two models are applied to data that are divided into two samples 
chronologically. Due to the reliability o f  the data, the results o f the more recent data are 
not only more consistent but also more significant throughout various specifications o f  
the basic model.
Along with the analysis made in the previous chapters, the empirical tests provide 
the following conclusions. First, the influence o f the financial behavior on the income 
level and distribution does enhance dramatically during the post-reform period. This 
evidence implies that the increase in the access to and choices o f financial instruments 
lead to higher participation rate o f the public in investment activities. However, even 
through the financial reform is implemented on both the banking and market sectors 
simultaneously, only the market sector expresses increasing influence on the income 
inequality and the income level. It is probably that the high return o f  the security 
market in the late 1980s and early 1990s made it more attractive to the investors than 
the banking sector.
Secondly, even though the behavior o f the stock market contributes to the 
economic growth positively in Taiwan, it is negatively correlated to the income 
inequality. As for the behavior o f the banking sector, neither the direction nor the 
significance o f its effects is clearly established in the tests. These findings are
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reinforced by the fact that the economies o f  the market-dominated system tend to 
experience higher income inequality than those o f  the bank-dominated one. The policy 
implication o f  this evidence is that in order to sustain steady and long-term economic 
growth, the implementation o f  financial reform must come with adequate discipline 
and regulation so that the induced detriment to income inequality can be minimized.
Third, among the auxiliary variables, the effect o f the unemployment on the 
income share o f the less endowed population is significant and negative. It indicates 
how closely the income inequality, economic growth and financial freedom are 
intertwined in the modern economy. Education, as indicated, bears no effect on the 
income distribution due to the specific cultural and educational background in Taiwan. 
Finally, the relative high value o f  the market capitalization compared to the value o f  
the capital increase displays the speculative and immature aspects o f the security 
market in Taiwan, which is supported by the empirical tests as well. In spite o f its 
negative impact on the income inequality this phenomenon shows no ill effect on the 
economic growth.
In summary, the experience o f  Taiwan’s financial reform provides several lessons 
to other LDCs, which attempt to undergo financial liberalization in the future. In order 
to stimulate economic growth, it is necessary to propel financial reform to increase the
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circulation and efficiency o f  the market. However, it is crucial to ascertain that the 
financial reform serves the objective o f facilitating the transactions and investments 
exclusively and avoids the speculative and manipulative components o f  the 
liberalization so that the harm to income equality can be minimized and the growth can 
be sustained. Another lesson drawn from the study is that even though Taiwan 
implemented its financial reform at a modest and incremental pace, Taiwan 
experienced high growth in a wide range o f  financial instruments and in its economy. 
This experience is clearly distinctive from the cases o f  some LDCs that propelled 
abrupt and comprehensive financial liberalization during the 1980s, resulting in 
instability, reduced investments and savings, and disappointing growth. Therefore, 
each economy should choose its own pace o f  progression according to its economic 
necessity, stage o f development, and culture characteristics so that the reform measures 
can be integrated into the existing macroeconomic surroundings in a stable and 
harmonious fashion.
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Appendices
Appendix 1: The derivation o f  equation (10). The Cobb-Douglas preferences 
defined directly over consumption and bequest is adopted as the utility function in our 
models. In other words, each agent tries to maximize his (her) utility as follows:
U(c.b) = logc“b‘‘ “’ = log(ay)“[( 1 -a)y |“ “‘
= log[a"G( I -a)“ ’“’n y | = logy + aloga + ( 1 -a)log( 1 -a)
Appendix 2: The derivation o f  equation (18). Let w„  .........   w,+j represent the
wealth functions o f generation t, t+1 t+j for a lineage working in the backward
sector over time, we attain:
w,+i = ( 1 -a)[X»+Wt( I +rs.t) I
Wt+2 = ( I -a)[X n+w ,+i ( I +rs.t) J = ( 1 -a)X„+( 1 -a)-( 1 +rs.t)Xn+( 1 -a)"( 1 +rs.,)‘ w ,
Wt+3 = ( I -a)?Ln+( I -«)■( I +rs.[)X^+( 1 -a)-’( 1 +rs.,)‘Àn +( 1 -a)^( I +rs.t)’wt
w,+j = ( I -a)/Ln+( I -a)“( 1+rs.t)Xn
107
+ (  I - a ) ^ C  I + r s . t  A n  + .  • • + (  I - a y e  i + r s . , y ' ‘ ^ + (  I - a y (  I + r s . , y  W t 
Wt+j = ( I -a)X„[ 1 -( 1 -ay ( 1 -Hrs.,yi/[ 1 -( 1 -a)( 14-rs.t) I 
Let j  approach we obtain the long run wealth function as follows:
vv;„ = limj-«Wt+j = ( 1 -a)?w[ 1 -( 1 -a)( 1 -kr*.,) |
Appendix 3: The proof o f the critical point. Let Wt = and substitute into
equation (32): W(+, = ( 1 -a)[ Rr + (Wt-I)( l+i) 1, it follows: 
w,+i = ( l - a ) [  R r  + (w ,,-0 (l+ i)  ]
=  (l-a )[  R r - 1(1+0 ] + (l-a )(l+ i)
=  ( l - a ) [  R r - I ( l + i )  | +  ( l - a ) ( l + i ) x {  ( l - a ) [ R r - I ( l + i ) l / [ l - ( l - a ) ( l + i ) l }
=  ( l - a ) [  R r - I ( l + i ) | / [ l - ( l - a ) ( l + i ) | =  ^
Since ôwi+|/5wt>0, it is straightforward to show that Wt+i <  for w, < , and Wt+i
> vv„ f o r w t >  vv„.
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